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This dissertation studies technological change in the context of energy and
environmental economics.
Technology plays a key role in reducing greenhouse gas emissions from the
transportation sector. Chapter 1 estimates a structural model of the car industry that
allows for endogenous product characteristics to investigate how gasoline taxes, R&D
subsidies and competition affect fuel efficiency and vehicle prices in the medium-
run, both through car-makers’ decisions to adopt technologies and through their
investments in knowledge capital. I use technology adoption and automotive patents
data for 1986-2006 to estimate this model. I show that 92% of fuel efficiency
improvements between 1986 and 2006 were driven by technology adoption, while
the role of knowledge capital is largely to reduce the marginal production costs of
fuel-efficient cars. A counterfactual predicts that an additional $1/gallon gasoline
tax in 2006 would have increased the technology adoption rate, and raised average
fuel efficiency by 0.47 miles/gallon, twice the annual fuel efficiency improvement
in 2003-2006. An R&D subsidy that would reduce the marginal cost of knowledge
capital by 25% in 2006 would have raised investment in knowledge capital. This
subsidy would have raised fuel efficiency only by 0.06 miles/gallon in 2006, but would
have increased variable profits by $2.3 billion over all firms that year.
Passenger vehicle fuel economy standards in the United States will require
substantial improvements in new vehicle fuel economy over the next decade. Economic
theory suggests that vehicle manufacturers adopt greater fuel-saving technologies for
vehicles with larger market size. Chapter 2 documents a strong connection between
market size, measured by sales, and technology adoption. Using variation consumer
demographics and purchasing pattern to account for the endogeneity of market
size, we find that a 10 percent increase in market size raises vehicle fuel efficiency
by 0.3 percent, as compared to a mean improvement of 1.4 percent per year over
1997-2013. Historically, fuel price and demographic-driven market size changes have
had large effects on technology adoption. Furthermore, fuel taxes would induce firms
to adopt fuel-saving technologies on their most efficient cars, thereby polarizing the
fuel efficiency distribution of the new vehicle fleet.
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Chapter 1: Knowledge Capital, Technology Adoption and Environmen-
tal Policies: Evidence from the US Automobile Industry
1.1 Introduction
Energy efficiency is essential to reducing greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) and
mitigating climate change. Policies such as gasoline taxes and R&D subsidies can
foster energy-efficient technologies (Acemoglu et al., 2014), but may target technology
adoption and R&D differently which may affect fuel efficiency and production costs
in different ways. Since the transportation sector contributed 27 percent of the
total US GHG emissions in 2011 (EPA, 2013), it has been a primary concern of
policymakers.
This paper studies how environmental policies incentivize firms to improve the
energy efficiency of their products. In particular, I ask how gasoline taxes, R&D
subsidies, and market competitiveness affect vehicle fuel efficiency and private welfare.
I propose a model in which firms endogenously choose the adoption of fuel-saving
technologies as well as R&D investment in knowledge capital (measured by patents).
The theoretical motivation is the following. Structural studies of how gasoline
taxes and other policies affect fuel efficiency have focused on vehicle pricing. However,
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government policies do more than influence consumer behavior. They may also
incentivize firms to change existing products to use fuel more efficiently. Ignoring
this channel can lead to a bias in fuel efficiency and welfare implications. In addition
to vehicle prices, my paper also endogenizes product characteristics and choices of
technology improvements. I then use counterfactuals to understand how different
policies would affect fuel efficiency and private welfare through these channels as
well as through standard channels of changes in demand and pricing.
My model has a two-stage structure following Fan (2013). In the first stage,
automakers choose vehicle performance characteristics (e.g., weight), technologies
to adopt, and investment in knowledge capital. In the second stage, automakers
take the above choices as given and set prices simultaneously. While the model is
static, which reflects the state of the literature for modelling endogenous product
characteristics (Fan, 2013; Wollmann, 2014), I interpret my results as reflecting
automakers’ abilities to update their cars between vehicle model-years as well as
changes in price. To relate technology improvements to fuel efficiency, I model fuel
efficiency being determined by product characteristics and technology improvements
following Knittel (2012).
I assemble a unique panel dataset linking automotive knowledge capital infor-
mation and automotive technology adoption information, to vehicle characteristics
and sales data for new cars in the US over the 1986-2006 period. I measure technology
adoption by a vector of technology choices, each of which describes the adoption of
energy-efficient powertrain or transmission technologies in a specific vehicle. For
instance, in the 1991 model-year, 86 percent of Honda Civics sold had multiple valves,
2
and 29 percent had multiport fuel injection. I measure knowledge capital by the
depreciated number of patents in the automotive engine technologies for which a
firm has applied, following Aghion et al. (2012). I allow knowledge capital to benefit
all vehicles a firm offers. This scale effect leads to some potential benefits of market
concentration.
Using my empirical model, I estimate the components that affect an automaker’s
profit function. Specifically, I estimate vehicle demand as a function of price, fuel
operating cost (depending on fuel efficiency) and performance characteristics. On
the supply side, I estimate the marginal cost of vehicle production as a function of
performance characteristics, technologies adopted, and knowledge capital stock. The
marginal cost is inferred from observed pricing and the demand structure. Similarly,
I estimate a cost function for developing knowledge capital in which the marginal
return of knowledge capital is inferred from firm’s first-order conditions. I address
the endogeneity of product characteristics using a set of a plausible exogenous choices
of earlier technologies as instruments.
My estimates show that technology adoption has been the main source of fuel
efficiency improvements for a vehicle. From 1986 to 2006, adoption of energy-efficient
technologies explains 92 percent of fuel efficiency improvements, holding performance
characteristics constant. I find that the primary incentive for developing knowledge
capital is to reduce the cost of producing a vehicle. Developing an additional 10
patents would lead to a reduction in production costs of $67 per car (in 2006 USD).
Consistent with the estimation results, my counterfactuals show that gas taxes
and R&D subsidies can affect fuel efficiency through different channels. Gas taxes
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mostly incentivize firms to adopt fuel-saving technologies, while R&D subsidies
mostly incentivize firms to develop knowledge capital. In turn, gas taxes create
sizable fuel efficiency improvements, while R&D subsidies mostly create private
benefits for firms via production cost reductions, although some of these are passed
to consumers in the form of lower vehicle prices.
A counterfactual increase of gasoline taxes at $1/gallon causes the 2006 fleet
to be 0.47 miles/gallon more fuel efficient, twice the observed annual improvement
in 2003-2006. This improvement comes from two sources: increases in technology
adoption and changes in prices. This shock changes prices disproportionally across
cars. While less fuel-efficient cars experience price reductions, more fuel-efficient
cars get more expensive, and these changes in prices tend to work against improving
fleet fuel efficiency.
In contrast to gasoline taxes, the main effect of R&D subsidies, according to
simulations, is to reduce production costs and therefore lower prices by inducing
knowledge capital development. I consider a R&D subsidy that reduces the marginal
cost of knowledge capital development by 25 percent in 2006. On average, this raises
the number of patents applied for by 37%, firms’ variable profits by $2.3 billion, and
consumer surplus by $20 million (in 2006 USD) (not including the cost to raise the
subsidy). The fuel efficiency benefits, however, is very limited. An average vehicle
only becomes 0.06 miles/gallon more efficient.
In addition to environmental policies, a further counterfactual suggests that
reducing competition can affect technology adoption and knowledge capital, building
on (Whinston (2008) Chapter 3). While the scale effect incentivizes merged firms to
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develop more knowledge capital, the loss of competition discourages them to adopt
fuel-saving technologies. This exercise sheds some light on potential situations in
which market concentration is important.
My primary contribution is to bridge the gap between the following studies.
On the one hand, there is a large literature that estimates structural models of the
automobile market to evaluate the effects of gasoline taxes and regulatory standards
(Bento et al., 2009; Jacobsen, 2013).1 These studies typically only allow price effects
and treat technological improvements as exogenous. On the other hand, reduced-
form studies suggest unignorable improvements in fuel-saving technologies (Newell
et al., 1999; Knittel, 2012; Klier & Linn, 2016). Knittel (2012) find that the log of
fuel efficiency for passenger cars is 29 percent greater in 2006 than in 1986 holding
performance characteristics constant. However, we know little about how policies
incentivize automakers to improve fuel efficiency. This study advances these studies
by endogenizing technological improvements that are documented in reduced-form
studies but not yet incorporated in structural works of policy analysis. Moreover, my
work distinguishes between two channels for improving fuel efficiency - knowledge
capital and technology adoption - and finds that gas taxes and R&D subsidies have
different roles.
This paper also contributes to our understanding of how policies induce in-
vestment in knowledge which in turn affects fuel efficiency. Popp (2002), Aghion et
1This large literature includes, but is not limited to, Berry (1994), Berry, Levinsohn, & Pakes
(1995), Petrin (2002), Austin & Dinan (2005), Busse, Knittel, & Zettelmeyer (2013), Gramlich
(2010), Klier & Linn (2012), Reynaert (2015), Whitefoot, Fowlie, & Skerlos (2013), and Wollmann
(2014).
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al. (2012) and Acemoglu et al. (2014) examine how energy prices and other policies
spur the development of clean technologies. They find that higher energy prices
tend to direct firms to patent more energy-efficient technologies. However, we know
little about the impacts of those policy-induced patents. Moreover, these studies
typically assume patents can improve productivity and lower product costs (Popp,
2004; Acemoglu et al., 2014). Despite some limitations, my study examines the
impacts of patents on vehicle fuel efficiency, vehicle prices, and private welfare, all of
which are either not addressed or are assumed away in previous studies. In addition,
my empirical work complements theoretical work that studies how market competi-
tiveness affects the cost-effectiveness of fuel efficiency policies (Fischer, 2010).2 My
study addresses the role of market competitiveness of fuel efficiency using a structural
framework of endogenous technological improvements.
The analysis has some limitations. First, in order to have a rich demand and
supply structure and to incorporate multiple channels of technological improvements,
I set up a two-stage static framework. A static framework reflects the state of
emerging literature for modelling endogenous product characteristics (Fan, 2013;
Wollmann, 2014). I interpret the framework as indicating automakers’ short and
medium run adjustment to policy incentives. In addition, in order to simulate
counterfactuals for a rich set of product characteristics, I treat my endogenous
variables as continuous variables instead of discrete choices following (Fan, 2013;
2In addition, Aghion et al. (2005) investigates the inverted-U shape relation of market competi-
tiveness on innovation measured by patents and the total factor productivity in an technological
change framework.
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Whitefoot et al., 2013). Building on this study, an important extension for future
work would be to incorporate dynamic intensive changes for a longer run analysis.3
Second, I model the impact of R&D investments as producing a deterministic
improvement in practical knowledge that can affect both fuel efficiency and production
costs. This reflects the fact that only observed successful increases in firms’ patent
portfolios (but not necessarily the actual spending which includes unsuccessful
knowledge development) can affect fuel efficiency and production costs. While the
model is deterministic, it allows me to highlight the role of knowledge capital in
production cost savings, which previous empirical work has not documented before.
To allow patents to have different values, I weight each patent using the number of
citations it receives normalized across years.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 presents the empirical
model. Section 1.3 describes the data. Section 1.4 discusses estimation strategies.
Section 2.4 presents the estimation results. In Section 1.6, I simulate the model
to analyze the effects of policy instruments and market consolidation. Section 1.8
concludes.
1.2 An Empirical Model of Technology Improvement
In this section, I set up an empirical model of technology improvement in a static
framework, which I estimate using panel data. On the demand side, consumers make
vehicle purchasing choices based upon vehicle prices, fuel efficiency, and performance
3Examples include entries and exits of vehicle models, dynamic positioning of different vehicle
segments, entries and exits of automakers, radical technological changes such as a transition to
electric/hybrid vehicles.
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characteristics. On the supply side, automakers are multi-product firms that can
adjust vehicle prices as well as product characteristics.
Automakers engage a two-stage game. In the first stage, firms choose perfor-
mance characteristics, fuel-saving technologies to adopt, and investment in knowledge
capital. In the second stage, firms set vehicle prices simultaneously. Firms make
their choices, given other firms’ choices. I assume there exists a pure strategy
Bertrand-Nash equilibrium, in which first-stage choices are optimal, given what will
happen in the second stage.
I feature two types of profitability incentives of technology improvement. The
first profitability incentive is to raise revenues and attract vehicle demand by providing
fuel-saving cars, through the channel of technology improvement. I also feature the
profitability incentive of knowledge capital, which has the potential to make the
production process more cost-effective.
I present the demand model and estimation equations in Section 1.2.1. I present
the supply model in Section 1.2.2 and estimation equations further in the Section
1.4.1.
1.2.1 New Vehicle Demand
Consumers participate a national market each year. They decide whether to
purchase a new vehicle or an outside good, and they choose which vehicle model
j (e.g., a Toyota Corolla) to purchase each year. For consumer i, the conditional
indirect utility from purchasing the outside good is ui0t = ωi0t. The indirect utility
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uijt from purchasing vehicle model j in year t is
uijt = αppjt + αg(fpt · gjt) + αxxjt + ηdmt + ξjt + [ωi,seg,t + (1− σseg)ωijt]
where pjt is vehicle price, fpt · gjt is fuel cost (or fuel economy) measured in dollar-
per-mile, and the vector xjt includes performance characteristics (measured in logs)
such as horsepower-to-weight and weight. Fuel cost fpt · gjt is the product of fuel
price fpt (dollar/gallon) in year t and fuel consumption gjt in gallons-per-mile. The
lower the fuel consumption rate, the more efficient of the vehicle. I use current fuel
price as the best prediction for future fuel prices, as suggested in Anderson, Kellogg,
& Sallee (2013). Parameter αp captures the marginal utility of income foregone from
purchasing a vehicle, αg captures the marginal disutility of expenditures on fuel, and
αx captures the utility received from vehicle performance characteristics. Gasoline
taxes will have a sizable effect on consumers’ vehicle choices if demand is elastic
respect to fuel economy.
ηdmt is the make-by-year (or brand-by-year) fixed effect. A parent automaker f
can own several brands (e.g., Honda owns Acura and Honda). (I list vehicle makes
and firms in Appendix A.1.) ξjt is the product characteristics gained from vehicle j. I
assume the unobserved individual-specific taste for vehicle j takes a nested logit form
ω̃ijt ≡ ωi,seg,t + (1− σseg)ωijt. It contains a segment-specific common shock ωi,seg,t
and a vehicle-specific shock ωijt, and the parameter σseg is the similarity coefficient
across vehicles within the same segment. I consider one layer of nests, consisting of
seven vehicle segments (small cars, medium cars, large/luxury cars, crossover utility
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vehicles (CUVs), sport utility vehicles (SUVs), pickup trucks, and vans). I assume
that ξjt and ω̃ijt capture unobserved quality and taste attributes that are not related
to fuel efficiency (e.g., quality of sound system and vehicle upholstery), and errors
ωi,seg,t, ωijt are i.i.d. with Type I extreme value distributions.
The predicted market share of vehicle j is the probability that vehicle j yields
the highest mean utility compared to all alternatives. Under the assumption of
nested logit demand, the market share of vehicle model j in segment g takes the form
of the logit choice probability sjt = sjt|seg(g)t × sseg(g)t, following (Berry, 1994). Both
conditional market share sjt|seg(g)t and segment market share sseg(g)t are functions of
the mean utility δjt (Details in Online Appendix). The mean utility from consuming
vehicle j in year t is given by δjt = αppjt+αgfpt ·gjt+αxxjt+ηdmt+ξj . The trans-log
version of the conditional predicted market share of vehicle j in year t is
ln sjt − ln s0t = αppj + αg(fpt · gjt) + αxxjt + σseg ln sj|seg,t + ηdmt + ξjt (1.1)
In future work, I shall model more flexible demand with random coefficients and
supply moments, following (Berry, Levinsohn, & Pakes, 1995; Petrin, 2002).
1.2.2 Automakers’ Choice of Technology Adoption and Knowledge
Capital
I model automakers’ choice problem as a two-stage game that is played each
year. To allow tractability, I set up a static model in which I do not formally consider
the dynamics in choosing R&D expenditure.
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Automakers choose technologies to adopt, knowledge capital to accumulate, and
performance characteristics to specify to maximize profits. The profit of automaker f
equals the sum of profits from all vehicles produced, less a firm-level cost associated
with knowledge accumulation H(i). The profit πh of vehicle model h depends on
vehicle price ph, knowledge capital i, technologies adopted ah, and vehicle performance
characteristics xh. Since this framework allows me to model how firms may respond
to potential demand and supply shocks by adjusting product characteristics other
than prices, my results provide medium run implications.
The timing of the game is the following. Automakers are multiple product
firms. They compete in a Bertrand game. In the first stage, automakers choose
vehicle performance characteristics, technology adoption, and knowledge capital
{x, a, i} simultaneously. I model these choices as joint decisions. In the second
stage, automakers take the above choices {x, a, i} as given and set vehicle prices p
simultaneously.
The relevant first stage profit function for automaker f in year t is: (I suppress
automaker subscript f and year subscript t for simplicity)




π1h(ph(x,a, i); x,a, i)−H(i)
π1h(ph(x,a, i);x,a, i) = [ph(x,a, i)− ch(xh, ah, i)] · sh (p(x,a, i), gh(xh, ah, i), xh)M
−F xh (xh)− F ah (ah)
where gh = g(xh, ah, i)
11
Π1 is the first-stage profit for firm f , π1h is the first-stage profit for vehicle model h,
and Hf is the set of vehicle produced by firm f . At the product level, firms face a
fixed cost associated with adopting fuel-saving technologies F ah (ah), and a fixed cost
associated with improving performance characteristics F xh (xh). At the firm level,
automakers face a cost of investment in knowledge capital accumulation H(i). M
is the market size. Firms solve their profit maximization problems, internalizing
vehicle demand shM that depends on vehicle price, fuel efficiency, and performance
characteristics.
I observe firms making incremental adjustment of all endogenous variables at
the model level between different model-years. I therefore model firms’ choices as
continuous changes. In addition, I assume firms know the cost errors (unobservable
to econometricians) when they make decisions. Thus there are potential endogeneity
problems in all cost equations discussed below.
In my empirical work, I assume that the fuel consumption rate ght is a Cobb-
Douglas function of performance characteristics Xht, following (Newell, Jaffe, &
Stavins, 1999; Knittel, 2012; Klier & Linn, 2016).




2,ht exp {Techht}+ εht
where Techht = θ0 + θaaht + θikit + ηgseg + η
g
m
kit = (1− δ)kit−1 + it
gh(xht, aht, it, t) = exp
{








The function gh = ght(xht, aht, it) approximates an engineering trade-off relation
between performance characteristics and fuel efficiency, while technology adoption
and knowledge capital can reduce the degree of trade-off. Most studies refer to
g(·) as the technology frontier, or the fuel efficiency frontier function. The vector
of vehicle performance characteristics xht ≡ lnXht, including fuel efficiency related
characteristics (measured in logs) such as horsepower-to-weight and weight. ηgseg and
ηgm are the segment fixed effect and the make fixed effect.
There are two ways to improve fuel efficiency of a vehicle without sacrificing
performance. Automakers could reduce the trade-off between performance and fuel
efficiency by adjusting energy-efficient features ah. (A complete list of technologies
ah is given in Section ?? and Table 1.1). Alternatively, automakers could expand
their knowledge pool by developing knowledge capital i. Knowledge depreciates at a




< 0, and ∂gh
∂i
< 0.
The profit from producing vehicle h depends on the marginal cost of producing
the vehicle cht, which is affected by the technology choices that automakers make. I
model the marginal cost function as a linear function of performance characteristics,
technologies adopted, and knowledge capital accumulated.




t + νht (1.3)
where ηcseg and ηct are the segment fixed effect and the year fixed effect. Improving
vehicle performance and adopting technologies could likely be costly, so I would
expect ∂ch
∂xh
> 0 and ∂ch
∂ah
> 0. If increasing knowledge capital can improve the
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cost-effectiveness of the production process, I would expect ∂ch
∂ki
< 0. The error term
νht captures unobserved cost component. I assume all costs associated with raising
fuel efficiency are captured by aht and kit and are not in the error term.
Apart from product characteristics, automakers also decide how much to invest
in knowledge capital. I observe the continuous changes in firms’ patent portfolios
and I model the cost of making these changes in a quadratic form. The firm-level
R&D cost associated with developing knowledge capital for firm f in year t is given
by: (I suppress firm subscript for simplicity)
Ht(i) = λ0 + (λ1 + η
i






ht(i) = λ1 + λ2it + η
i
type + λtt+ ut (1.4)
ht(i) is the marginal R&D cost of knowledge capital. ut is the unobserved first-order
cost with respect to knowledge capital. ηiype indicates whether the automaker is a
Japanese firm or a US firm. The omitting category is the European firms and other
firms. λt is the parameter for the time trend. Expanding knowledge pool could be
costly, so that I expect λ1 > 0. I also expect a regular convex cost shape so that
λ2 > 0.
In addition to the marginal cost of production, there can be fixed costs as-
sociated with improving performance characteristics F xht and adopting fuel-saving
technologies F aht for each model, regardless of the sales. I assume fixed costs take a
conventional quadratic form
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where fxht and faht are the slopes of the fixed costs. exht and eaht are the unobserved
cost components of performance characteristics and technologies adopted in model h
in year t. ηxf and ηaf are the firm fixed effects and φxt and φat are parameters for the
time trends.4 The signs of φx1 and φa1 depend on where a model h locates on the cost
curves.
In the second stage, automakers choose vehicle prices, taking product charac-
teristics, technology adoption and knowledge capital {x, a, i} as given. The relevant
second-stage profit function for firm f is: (I suppress the time subscript t for
simplicity)





π2h(ph;x, a, i) = (ph − ch(xh, ah, i)) · sh(p,g,x) ·M − F xh (xh)− F ah (ah)
where gh = g(xh, ah, i)
Automakers can increase the fleet fuel economy in four ways. First, they
can adjust the vehicle prices. Consumers respond to changes of vehicle prices
4Improving product quality could be potentially costly, so φx0 and φa0 can be positive. However,
parameters in fixed cost are identified using first stage equations so that I cannot empirically test
the signs of φx0 and φa0 .
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so that sales of different vehicles will be affected. Second, they can adopt some
specific technologies for specific vehicle models, so that models are more fuel-efficient
holding performance attributes constant. This is one source of shift of the fuel
efficiency frontier. Third, they can increase knowledge capital and apply for more
patents in fuel-saving technologies. The improvement of practical knowledge from
knowledge capital may also shift the fuel efficiency frontier. Last, automakers can
produce at different allocations of fuel economy and vehicle performance attributes,
improving fuel efficiency by sacrificing vehicle performance such as horsepower. This
is essentially a movement along the fuel efficiency frontier. This study focuses on
the second and the third channels while still allowing possibilities of other channels.
1.3 Data
In order to estimate the endogenous production choice model described in the
Model Section 1.2, I compile a new dataset of US new vehicle market over 1986-2006.
Specifically, the data set contains information of adoption of fuel-saving technologies,
automotive patents, vehicle characteristics, and vehicle prices and sales. I describe
data for technology adoption and knowledge capital in Section 1.3.1 and other data
in Section 1.3.2.
1.3.1 Technology Adoption and Knowledge Capital
Technology Adoption. I link the automotive technology adoption and
automotive innovation data to the vehicle sales data for this exercise. I collect data
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of technology adoption and other vehicle characteristics from the U.S. EPA Fuel
Economy Guide Database and the U.S. EPA Fuel Economy Trend Database over
model years 1986-2006.5 Technology adoption data contain information of whether a
vehicle implements certain specific powertrain, transmission, or drivetrain technology.
For instance, I observe whether a vehicle has a 5-speed gear box, and whether a
vehicle features variable valve timing.
Technology adoption of a model represents the ex-post proportion of vehicle
models sold with specific fuel-saving technologies. Table 1.1 panel B presents summary
statistics of technologies adopted. Figure 1.1 plots the market penetration trends of
five major technologies that is well-adopted over 1986-2006.6 According to the Fuel
Economy Trend Report by (EPA, 2008, 2014), there are 6 major technologies that
have been penetrating over the sample period 1986-2006. They are (i) multi-point
fuel injection (Port/MFI), (ii) torque conversion lock-up, (iii) multi-valve (more than
2 valves per cylinder), (iv) advanced transmission (5-gear transmission), (v) variable
valve timing (VVT), and (vi) turbocharger. These technologies play important roles
in enhancing vehicle fuel efficiency.
These technologies are well-developed fuel-saving devices installed or fuel-saving
specifications featured in the powertrain or gearbox. For example, Figure A.1 in
Section A.2 shows an engine with four valves per cylinder. Higher numbers of valves
per cylinder can allows a good air and fuel intake and result in significant efficiency
5I thank Aaron Hula and other authors of EPA Fuel Economy Trend Report for helping me get
access to a few technology adoption variables in the Trend database that are not covered in the
Guide database.
6Turbocharger is a trendy technology adopted over 1986-2006. I do not include it since its
market penetration rate is less than 10 percent for all years.
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improvements given vehicle power (EPA, 2014). I document descriptions and fuel
economy benefits of all the above technologies in Appendix A.2.
I treat these technology adoption choices as continuous variables rather than
discrete choices variables. Given a specific model, there are a variety of trims, many
of which have different technology specifications. Therefore, for a vehicle model j in
year t, the proportion of vehicle sold with a specific technology can range from 0
to 1. For example, the technology adoption rate of 5-speed gearbox ah,5speed is 37
percent for Honda Accord in model-year 1997.
Knowledge Capital. I collect automotive knowledge capital data from OECD
Triadic Patent Family Database (TPF). In particular, I collect the number of patents
applied from each automaker for internal combustion engine technology to measure
the knowledge capital i.7 Table 1.1 panel C presents summary statistics of knowledge
capital. Table 1.2 lists a summary of patents in these categories.
These TPF patents represent knowledge of general technologies for practical use.
The novelty of most patents are for the “utility” purpose, i.e. they usually innovate
to provide better methodologies or better subtle system specifications. A typical
patent EP25695518 with patent classification code “F01L: Cyclical operation valves
for combustion engines” is titled as “Methods and System for Internal Combustion
Engine” (Section A.3). According to the patent description, the novelty of this patent
is that it “... improves engine unit to include a separating aperture between cylinders
... and a separating valves”. Most patents, just like this one, have the potential to
7I also collect the number of patents on alternative fuel vehicle engine technology to measure
the cross-category knowledge capital (hereafter AFV knowledge capital). I use them to construct
two instrumental variables.
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allow cars with given attributes to be more efficient, and allow manufacturers to
achieve the same specifications more effortlessly.
The number of patent applied by automaker f in year t is referred to as
knowledge capital ift. Knowledge accumulates according to kift = kif,t−1 + ift. The
cumulative knowledge is referred to as knowledge stock, or stock of knowledge capital.
I model knowledge stock ki to affect production cost c(·) and fuel efficiency g(·).
I model the incremental knowledge capital i to enter the R&D cost of knowledge
investment.
To account for appropriate energy-efficient patents, I use definitions suggested
by Aghion et al. (2012), Haščič et al. (2008), Vollebergh (2010), and Green Inventory
developed by the World International Property Organization (WIPO). Appendix
A.3 presents the International Patent Classification (IPC) codes of all patents
categories selected in this study. To correctly identify patent ownership, I make
several assumptions. For examples, I split the ownership of a patent across multiple
firms if they collaborate on that patent.8 To account for heterogeneous values of
patents, I weight the importance of a patent using the number of citations a patent
receive (i.e. forward citation) 9 following (Trajtenberg, 1990), and I normalize the
8(1) I assume that if a patent is applied by n co-assignees, then each co-assignees will obtain 1/n
unit of flow of knowledge as in the innovation literature. (2) I assume that if two firms i and j had
merged in year t, then i and j would acquire each others’ stock of knowledge after the consolidation.
(3) I assume if a firm had separated into i and j in year t, then both won’t obtain each others’
stock of knowledge from year t onward.
9For a patent family k, its forward citation is the number of subsequent patent families that
cites patent family k.
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numbers of forward citation for each cohort year following Hall et al. (2000, 2001),10
using citation data from OECD Citation Database.
Here I discuss the advantages and limitations of using the number of patents for
internal combustion engines technologies (i.e. powertrain technologies for conventional
vehicles) to measure knowledge capital. First, patents are a good measure in terms of
representing firms’ own intellectual property in the automotive industry. Although
patents have to be published, intellectual property is rarely shared, traded, or
licensed in this industry. There are less than 3% of Triadic Patent Families that
are traded over 1978-2006 (Aghion et al., 2012). In addition, the licensing royal
rate for automotive inventions is as low as 5%, compared to 8% for pharmaceutical
inventions and 12.5% for internet and software/media inventions.11 Therefore, there
is very minimum concern that patents do not include the proportion of knowledge
that a firm has from using other firms’ patents.
Second, the number of patents for internal combustion engine technologies
(i.e. powertrain technologies) is a good approximation for other types of fuel-saving
knowledge capital that firm have patented. For example, automakers also patent
transmission and drivetrain related technologies. The number of transmission-related
patents, for instance, is highly correlated and co-linear with the number of powertrain
patents. I therefore model the effects of transmission-related knowledge and other
energy-efficient knowledge to be picked up by using powertrain-related patents.
10Weighting importance of a patent by the number of forward citations received usually causes
dated patents receive more citations compared to recent patents. To correct the truncation issue of
patent citations, I normalize patent citation using cohort weights, i.e. total numbers of citation
received by all patents applied in year t, following Hall et al. (2000, 2001).
11KPMG (2012) Profitability and Royalty Rates Across Industries: Some Preliminary Evidence.
20
Third, I assume all patents on new powertrain technology have the same effects
on cost components and same effects on fuel efficiency. For example, the following
two categories of patents affect the system to the same extent in my model: (i) a
patent deigned for improving the energy-efficiency of the air-conditioning system,
which is categorized under “1.7 General, Improved Fuel Efficiency” in Table 1.2;
versus (ii) a patent designed for improving engine turbocharging properties, which
is categorized under “1.5 Turbocharger” in Table 1.2. I have incorporate a patent’s
value by its citation. Investigating the variations of fuel efficiency outcomes and cost
implications across different categories of patents is very important, but is beyond
the scope of this study.
Here I discuss one misconception about the linkages between technology adop-
tion and knowledge capital. I treat technology adoption and knowledge capital as two
types of choices that automakers decide jointly in their profit maximization problems.
Automakers do not necessarily have to file patents for a type of technology first, in
order to adopt it later. First, technologies adopted in our sample are well-developed
technologies that are ready to be adopted. Second, I observe many cases in which
firms have adopted a technology first, and then improved their technologies and filed
a patent on that technology many years later. For example, Chrysler filed its first
Triadic patent on turbocharger in 1997 but it has already installed turbochargers
starting in 1985 with 5% penetration rate. Volkswagen filed patents on turbocharger
in 1995 but has already adopted this technology in 1986 with 9% adoption rate.
Third, three quarters of engine technologies are uncategorized technology for general
practical use rather than geared towards specific technology adoption (Table 1.2).
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For the above reasons, I treat innovation and technology adoption as separate choices
that firms decide jointly.
1.3.2 Other Data
Information on grandfathered technologies are collected for this study. I describe
and discuss these technologies in detail when discussing instrumental variables in
the Identification Section 1.4.3. This list includes (i) carbureted fuel injection, (ii)
3-speed transmission, (iii) automatic transmission without lockup converter, and (iv)
throttle body injection (TBI). This list of technology has been gradually replaced by
better technologies over 1986-2006. Summary statistics of grandfathered technologies
are on Table 1.1 Panel B.
I aggregate vehicle prices, sales, and characteristics of 24,000 trim-level vehicles
over 1986-2006 into 3,700 vehicle models. This study is restricted to conventional
vehicles that have internal combustion engines and use gasoline as the primary
fuel.12 Vehicle prices and sales data are from Ward’s Automotive.13 Vehicle fuel
efficiency and performance characteristics are from Automotive News.14 Performance
characteristics include horsepower-to-weight, weight, transmission type, and fuel
type. They are produced by 45 brands and 23 parent companies. Summary statistics
of vehicle characteristics are on Table 1.1 Panel A and Panel D.
12I do not include diesel vehicles, which only consist of less than 1 percent of US market shares.
13Prices and sales data is kindly shared by Joshua Linn used in Klier & Linn (2010). Vehicle
prices are the manufacturer suggested retail prices (MSRP).
14This data is provided by Knittel (2012).
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I collect tax-inclusive fuel price from U.S. Energy Information Administration
(EIA) and transportation sector R&D support the International Energy Agency
(IEA).
1.3.3 Suggestive Evidence: Effects of Gasoline Taxes, R&D Subsidies,
and Competitiveness
This section presents suggestive evidence on the correlations between techno-
logical improvements and environmental policies and economic conditions.
I find that knowledge capital is negatively correlated to gasoline prices and
HHI, which is consistent with my simulation results in Section 1.6. In Table 1.3, I
present the correlation of technology improvement and gasoline prices and market
competitiveness. I measure the industry competitiveness using the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI). The smaller the HHI, the more competitive the market is.
I detrend all variables to remove spurious correlations from a common time trend.
Table 1.3 suggests that firms on average may have stronger incentives to
expand knowledge pool when the market is more competitive, and weaker incentives
to develop knowledge capital and to sit on existing knowledge pool when the industry
is less competitive. This correlation only applies to average firms. Consolidated firms
however, may find market concentration provide incentives for them to patent more.
In addition, higher gasoline prices may discourage firms to patent more, which is
consistent to the estimation results later that fuel efficiency benefits from knowledge
capital is limited.
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In contrast to knowledge capital, I find ambiguous correlation between tech-
nology adoption and environmental policies and economic conditions. As for newer
technologies such as 5 speed gear and Variable Valve Timing (refereed to Figure 1.1),
they are positively correlated to gasoline prices and negatively correlated to HHI.
Firms on average may have stronger incentives to adopt these technologies when
facing higher gasoline prices and when market is more competitive. As for more
matured technologies such as Multi-valve and Multiport Fuel Injection (refereed to
Figure 1.1), I find the evidence is the opposite.
1.4 Estimation
I estimate the demand and supply simultaneously using the Generalized Meth-
ods of Moments. The unit of an observation is a vehicle model at a model-year.
The demand moment follows from the nested logit new car demand, specified in
Equation (1.1) in Section 1.2.1. As for the supply moments, they are derived from
automakers’ first order conditions with respect to prices, performance characteristics,
technology adoption, and knowledge capital. Demand parameters, parameters of the
fuel efficiency frontier, and variations in the gasoline prices, play important roles in
identifying the cost structures.
1.4.1 Necessary Equilibrium Conditions and Estimation Equations
Based upon the static model described in the Model Section 1.2, market
equilibrium is described by first-order conditions of automakers’ profit maximization
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problems and market clear conditions. I assume that a pure-strategy Bertrand Nash
equilibrium exists. In this section, I present necessary optimality conditions that I
use to identify the structure of marginal production cost c(·), marginal R&D cost
h(·), and the structure of fuel efficiency frontier g(·).
The first-order condition of the second-stage profit Π2f with respect to vehicle
price pj is the conventional pricing equation. I suppress time subscript t for simplicity.
foc
(p)







foc(p) : s + ∆sp(p− c) = 0
where ∆sp is the response matrices containing the derivatives of market shares with
respect to vehicle prices. Component ∆sp(h, j) = ∂sh∂pj depends on predicted market
share and demand side price elasticities. With the two-stage optimization, technology
adoption choices, stock of knowledge capital, and vehicle performance characteristics
are given when automakers choose vehicle prices. This equation is used to compute
estimated marginal cost ch, given data and demand parameters. I use estimated cost
ch to identify parameters in the marginal cost function Equation (1.3).
First-order conditions of the first-stage profit Π1f with respective to knowledge
capital, technology adoption, and vehicle characteristics are the following. (I suppress
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These optimality conditions illustrate private costs and gains associated with each
first-stage choice variables. On the left-hand side of Equations (1.8)-(1.10), I compute
the firm-level aggregated marginal returns of knowledge capital R(i)t , the model-level
marginal returns of technologies adopted R(a)jt and performance characteristics R
(x)
jt .
On the right hand side parameters on cost structure are to be estimated. Technology
adoption ajt are continuous in this study. (See the Data Section 1.3.1 for details on
continuousness of technology adoption).
I use the first order condition of knowledge capital in Equation (1.8) to identify
parameters in R&D cost function. I also use this equation as the best-response
function to compute counterfactual knowledge capital for simulation exercises. Right
hand side of this equation represents the marginal cost from investing in knowledge
capital. The left hand side presents the marginal return of doing so. It could reduce
the cost of producing a vehicle by ∂ch
∂i
, and it could raise profits through improving
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. Other terms in this equation account
for indirect effects knowledge stock have through affecting vehicle prices.
Similarly, I use the first order condition of technology adoption in Equation
(1.9) to estimate fixed cost parameters, and to compute best-response of technology
adoption in the counterfactual scenarios. Right hand side of this equation represents
the marginal fixed cost of technology adoption. The left hand side presents the
marginal return of technology adoption. It includes the additional profit a firm raise








accounting for its direct effects on marginal production cost ∂cht
∂ajt
and indirect effects
on vehicle prices. I use the first order condition of performance characteristics in








in the above first-order conditions are the re-










are responses of second-stage choice
prices with respect to first-stage choices. I assume the equilibrium function of vehicle
prices are smooth with respect to first-stage choices. Following Villas-Boas (2007)’s









by applying the implicit function
theorem on foc(p)j . (See Online Appendix).
I use the demand moment, marginal cost moment, frontier moment, and R&D
cost moment to construct the GMM objective functionG′(α, γ, θ, λ, φ)WG(α, γ, θ, λ, φ).
Parameters need to identify include (1) parameters in the vehicle demand func-
15Villas-Boas (2007) compute second-stage retail pricing choices with respect to first-stage
wholesale pricing choices, assuming the second-stage choice is differentiable with respect to first-
stage choices.
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tion {αp, αg, αx, σseg}, (2) parameters in the marginal cost of production function
{γ0, γx, γa, γi}, (3) parameters in the fuel efficiency technology frontier function
{θ0, θx, θa, θi}, (4) parameters in the cost of knowledge capital function {λ1, λ2}, (5)
parameters associated with fixed cost of adopting technologies and improving vehicle
performance {φa1, φa2, φx1 , φx2}. The values of the structural errors that I use in the
moments conditions are
ξjt = ξjt(· ;αp, αg, αx, σseg)
= ln sjt − ln s0t − αppjt − αg(fpt · gjt)− αxxjt − ηdmt − σseg ln sj|seg,t(1.11)
νjt = νjt(· ; γ0, γx, γa, γi; αp, σseg)
= cjt − γ0 − γxxjt − γaajt − γikit − ηcseg − F ct (1.12)
εjt = εjt(· ; θ0, θx, θa, θi)
= gjt − exp
{







ut = ut(· ;λ1, λ2; αp, αg, σseg, γi, θ0, θx, θa, θi)
= R
(i)
t − λ1 − λ2it − ηitype − λtt (1.14)
eajt = e
a
jt(· ;φa1, φa2; αp, αg, σsegγa, θ0, θx, θa, θi)
= R
(a)
jt − φa1 − φa2ajt − ηaf − φat t (1.15)
exjt = e
x
jt(· ;φx1 , φx2 ; αp, αg, αx, σseg, γx, θ0, θx, θa, θi)
= R
(x)
jt − φx1 − φx2xjt − ηxf − φxt t (1.16)
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The firm-level aggregated marginal returns of knowledge capital R(i)t , the model-level
marginal returns of technologies adopted R(a)jt and performance characteristics R
(x)
jt
are given in firms’ first-order conditions in Equation (1.8)-(1.10).
1.4.2 Identification
I estimate Equations (1.11)-(1.16) jointly. The identification of parameters
comes from the exclusive variables, prices and fuel economy, in the demand equation
(1.11), where fuel price fpt creates important time varying variations. Identification
also comes from stock of knowledge in the marginal production cost equation (1.12),
as well as the functional form assumption in the fuel efficiency frontier equation
(1.13) which I adopt from the literature.
All dependent variables in the cost structure are constructed using first order
conditions, so that estimation of demand parameters and other moments play
important roles in driving the variations. For example, marginal cost cjt in the
moment equation (1.12) is solved from the first-order condition with respect to price.
Demand parameter αp and σseg as well as vehicle prices and sales play key roles
in driving variations in the marginal cost, and the marginal cost error is therefore
νjt = νjt(· ; γ0, γx, γa, γi; αp, σseg). Take the marginal return of knowledge capital
as another example. R(i)t is solved from the first-order condition with respect to
knowledge capital. Therefore, marginal cost parameter γi (production cost reduction
channel), fuel efficiency frontier parameter θi (fuel efficiency improvement channel),
demand parameter on fuel economy αg and other parameters play important roles in
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affecting and driving variations in the marginal return of investment in knowledge
capital.
There are, however, still unobserved demand and cost components that may
raise endogeneity issues. Most studies of the vehicle demand literature treat vehicle
characteristics as exogenous, following the seminal work Berry (1994) and Berry,
Levinsohn, & Pakes (1995). In this framework, automakers observe the cost shocks
{νjt, ut, eajt, exjt} (unobservable to econometricians) before setting performance char-
acteristics, knowledge capital to develop, and technologies to adopt. Automakers
also observe the demand tastes ξjt (unobserved product quality to econometricians)
before setting vehicle prices. Prices and performance characteristics, therefore, could
potentially be correlated with unobserved demand shocks. For the same reason, price,
performance characteristics, knowledge capital, and technology adoption might be
correlated with cost components that are unobservable to econometricians. Vehicle
performance characteristics, which are usually used in estimating vehicle demand,
are therefore no longer valid instruments in this study. I explain the instrument
variables used next.
1.4.3 Instruments
I use three sets of instrumental variables for this study to deal with the
endogeneity issue: (i) longer-run characteristics, (ii) grandfathered technologies, and
(iii) cross-category knowledge and knowledge spillover. Here I start by explaining
my instrumental variables in the context of the demand equation first.
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Longer-run characteristics. First, I use longer-term (LR) vehicle character-
istics xlrf,j to construct the second set of instruments,D(x)lrf,j =
{
xlrf,j − xlrj∈seg, xlrf,j − xlrf,−j
}
,
as suggested in (Whitefoot, Fowlie, & Skerlos, 2013). Some vehicle characteristics
take longer-run to plan and design, such as drivetrain specification (whether a
vehicle is all/4-wheel-drive).16 This feature is usually determined before a model
enters the market and is not changed very often. Still concerning about potential
endogeneity from using a model’s own variations in longer-run characteristics, I
use variations from competing vehicle models and construct the following “differ-
ence” measure D(x)lrf,j =
{
xlrf,j − xlrj∈seg, xlrf,j − xlrf,−j
}
as the instrumental variables,
following (Whitefoot, Fowlie, & Skerlos, 2013).
The identifying assumption used in BLP and most demand estimation studies
is that product characteristics are exogenous. The identifying assumptions here are
that longer-run characteristics are per-determined before ξj are known to firms, and
other products’ dated technologies do not affect consumer utility directly, but only
affect consumer utility by affecting vehicle h through competition. In addition, I also
assume that fuel efficiency term fpt · gjt captures all fuel-efficiency quality of a car,
which I test in the robustness section. This assumption implies that the distance of
adoption rates of old technologies from competing models (e.g., 3-speed gear) should
be uncorrelated with unobserved non-efficiency related qualities ξj (e.g., quality such
as sound system, leather seats).
16I use do not use vehicle dimension because I only observe them after 1997 in Ward’s. Whitefoot
et al. (2013) also suggest to use powertrain architecture (diesel engine, hybrid engine) as instruments.
I do not use them here because diesel vehicles and hybrid vehicles are thought as on different
technology frontier gj(·) compared with gasoline vehicles. They are likely weak instrument since
the market share of diesel and hybrid cars are very small.
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Grandfathered technologies. Similar to the idea of longer-run character-
istics, I use grandfathered technologies aoldf,j to construct my instrument variables,
D(a)oldf,j =
{
aoldf,j − aoldj∈seg, aoldf,j − aoldf,−j
}
, by utilizing the rich information about the
process of technology evolution in the data.
I include the following four grandfathered technologies: (i) 3-speed/gear trans-
mission ag3f,j, (ii) carburetor a
c
f,j, (iii) automatic transmission without lockup anlf,j,
and (iv) engines with 8 cylinders ac8f,j as instruments, using reference from EPA
(2008, 2014). Figure 1.1 and Figure 1.3 illustrate a brief history of technology
evolution over 1986-2006 period. Over my sample period, Figure 1.1 and Figure 1.3
suggest that high-speed transmissions such as 5-speed and 6-speed transmissions
have gradually replaced 3-speed and 4-speed transmissions. Automatic transmission
with lockup and manual transmission with higher gears have gradually replaced
automatic transmission without lockup. Multiport fuel injection (Port, or MBI)
and variable valve timing (VVT) have gradually replaced carburetor fuel delivery
system and throttle body injection (TBI). Engines with multiple valves per cylinders
gradually replaced engines with 2 or less valves. Engines with 4 and 6 cylinder
gradually replaced engines with 8 cylinders. Similar to longer-run characteristics,
dated technologies aoldf,j have been introduced to vehicle model j when automakers
design the previous generations. So that dated technologies are per-determined
features when automakers making choices on new technologies.
There are some potential endogeneity from using a model’s own variation.
Specifically, variations of dated technologies aoldj can come from variations of tech-
nology adoption aj per see, if the new technologies directly replace those dated
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technologies. To attenuate this concern, I select dated technologies that is not
directly in competition with the new technologies that have been penetrate in
1986-2006. For example, I use 3-speed gearbox transmission to instrument 5-speed
transmission. There is an intermediate technology 4-speed transmission that I do
not use as instrument since it was in direct competition with 5-speed transmission.
Another example is carburetor, which is a dated fuel injection technology that I use to
instrument Port (Multiport Fuel Injection). There are intermediate technologies (e.g.,
single-port and two-port fuel injection) that I do not use as instrumental variables
since they can be endogenous.
Still concerning about potential endogeneity from using a model’s own vari-
ations in technologies, I construct the following “difference” measure D(a)oldf,j ={
aoldf,j − aoldj∈seg, aoldf,j − aoldf,−j
}
as the instrumental variables, similar to the idea in
(Whitefoot, Fowlie, & Skerlos, 2013). The idea is to exploit both models’ own
variations and variations from competing models. The intuition is to compare how
advanced model j is compared to other models. The former instrument, (aoldf,j−aoldj∈seg),
measures the difference between technology adoption rate of a model and other vehi-
cles in the same segment sold by competitors. The latter instrument, (aoldf,j − aoldf,−j),
measures the difference between technology adoption rate of a model and other
vehicles in the same segment sold by the same firm. Both inform us how far other
models are ahead of the game and have a potential to predict choices of price,
performance characteristics, and technologies to adopt.
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The identifying assumption used here is the same as in the first set of instru-
ment. However, still concerning about remaining endogeneity, I use one-year lag of
grandfathered technologies as a robustness checks.
Cross-category knowledge and knowledge spillovers. Third, I use cross-
category knowledge stock kiafv, same-category spillover Ski, and cross-category
spillover Skiafv to instrument the demand. Same-category refers to patents for
internal combustion engines. Cross-category knowledge stock refers to cumulative
patents for alternative fuel vehicle (AFV) engines. I construct the spillover variables
using each firm’s inventors’ geographic locations, and using the numbers of patents
filed in each region, following Aghion et al. (2012).
This set of instrument assumes the following. Toyota’s knowledge about hybrid
and electric cars (say Toyota Prius) and spillover in regular cars from the industry
can help Toyota improve fuel efficiency of regular vehicles they produce such as
Toyota Camry. However, their knowledge about designing engines for Toyota Prius
and spillovers they get from the industry are not correlated with unobserved demand
taste associated with Toyota Camry. Similar to first two sets of instruments, I assume
that fuel efficiency term fpt · gjt captures all fuel-efficiency quality of a car, which
means that the unobserved demand taste associated with Toyota Camry contains
only non-efficiency related quality.
First stage results are given in Online Appendix. Standard errors are robust
to heteroscedasticity. These three sets of instruments provide enough information
in predicting vehicle prices, fuel economy, and performance characteristics in the
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demand equation. F-statistics for exclusive variables are 56.7 for vehicle price, 228.0
for fuel economy, 40.6 for horsepower-to-weight, and 217.9 for weight.
To estimate the marginal cost and the fixed cost equations (1.12), (1.15)-(1.16),
I use the above three sets of instruments. There are more endogenous variables in
the marginal cost equations compared to the demand equation. I therefore use, in
addition, the interactions of the third set of instruments {kiafv, Ski, Skiafv} with
dated technologies D(a)oldf,j , and the interactions of {kiafv, Ski, Skiafv} with longer-
run characteristics D(x)lrf,j to instrument supply equations (1.12) and (1.15)-(1.16).
To estimate the R&D cost equation (1.14), I use industry-wide spillover and
cross-category spillover to predict automakers’ choices of knowledge capital accu-
mulation. Since this equation is evaluated at firm-level, I only use the third set of
instrument {kiafv, Ski, Skiafv} for this equation.
1.5 Estimation Results
I estimate parameters using the Generalized Methods of Moments. I present
demand estimation in Section 1.5.1, results of fuel efficiency frontier in Section 1.5.2,
and results of cost structure in Section 1.5.3. See Online Appendix for the first-stage
results.
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1.5.1 Estimation Results of New Cars Demand
In this section, I present estimates of parameters in the model. Table 1.4
includes parameters of the demand system, structures of automakers’ marginal cost
function, marginal R&D cost function, and the shape of fuel economy frontier.
Panel A of Table 1.4 presents estimates of the demand system. Results suggest
that consumers have strong disutility from high vehicle prices and high fuel costs,
and they gain utility from better performance characteristics. Parameter αp is
-0.55, which implies that the average own-price elasticity of price is -3.48.17 The
elastic demand suggests that policies that affect vehicle prices via affecting the cost
components, such as a R&D subsidy, have a potential in creating incentives for
automakers to improve fuel efficiency technologies.
The parameter for fuel cost (dollar-per-mile) αg is -17.91, which implies that
the average own elasticity of fuel cost is -2.05.18 The elastic demand of fuel cost
suggests that policies that affect fuel costs, such as a gasoline tax (a potential carbon
tax), have a potential in creating incentives to increase knowledge capital and to
adopt better technologies responding to the shifts of demand towards fuel-efficient
vehicles.
17The average own-price elasticity is comparable to the literature. The average own-price elasticity
is around -5.4 in Berry, Levinsohn, & Pakes (1995) (implied using Logit part of the results as
a comparison), -1.4 in Klier & Linn (2012) (Nested Logit with BLP IV), -5.4 in Klier & Linn
(2012) (Nested Logit with engine-based IV), -1.9 in Whitefoot, Fowlie, & Skerlos (2013) (Random
Coefficient), and -1.97 for new cars in Bento et al. (2009) .
18Most papers do not report own-product elasticity w.r.t. fuel cost. Here I compare the average
elasticity of fuel economy for both own product and cross products. The number is -1.07 here. The
imputed average fuel cost elasticity is -1.23~-1.56 in Klier & Linn (2012), -0.20~-0.91 in Gramlich
(2010).
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To interpret the estimation results of the demand system, I calculate the
willingness-to-pay (WTP) for fuel efficiency improvements in Table 1.5, holding price
and performance characteristics fixed. I consider two partial-equilibrium cases for the
2006 new cars market. In the first case, I calculate the willingness-to-pay of 1% fuel
efficiency improvement at actual gasoline price ($2.16/gallon). In the second case, I
calculate the willingness-to-pay for the same amount of fuel efficiency improvement
with an increase of gasoline price by $0.5/gallon.
First, I find that consumers have a higher willingness to pay for efficiency
improvement in larger vehicles than smaller vehicles in both cases. For instance,
consumers are willing to pay an additional $469 for 1% fuel efficiency improvement
for a pickup truck at actual 2006 gasoline price, but only $229 for a small car. In
addition, I find that consumers are willing to pay higher extra amount for vehicles
with worse fuel efficiency when facing higher tax-inclusive gasoline prices. With an
increase of gasoline prices by $0.5/gallon, consumer are willing to pay extra $110
dollars for a pickup truck, but only $54 for a small car.
1.5.2 Estimation Results of the Fuel Efficiency Frontier
In Table 1.4 Panel C, I present the estimation results of the fuel economy
frontier function gjt = g(xjt, ajt, it). g represents the fuel consumption of a vehicle in
gallon-per-mile. The smaller the fuel consumption rate g is, the more fuel-efficient a
vehicle is. Positive signs of performance characteristics suggest that there is trade-off
between performance and fuel efficiency. Negatives signs of technology adoption and
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knowledge capital suggest that both channels of technology improvement can drive
down the fuel consumption and drive up fuel efficiency, holding vehicle performance
characteristics constant. Compare to literature benchmark gjt = g(xjt, t) that uses
year fixed effects as sources of shift of frontier over time, I use variations in technology
adoption and knowledge capital in my specification.
Figure 1.4 Panel A plots the effects of performance characteristics and technol-
ogy improvement on fuel efficiency. The vertical axis plots the fraction of improve-
ments in fuel efficiency.19 The downward sloping lines suggest that the improvements
in horsepower-to-weight have reduced fuel efficiency by 19 percentage points, and
the improvements in weight have reduced fuel efficiency by 6 percentage points over
1986-2006. Part of this trade-off in fuel efficiency is canceled out by technology
improvement, which have led to 15 percentage points fuel efficiency improvements
over 1986-2006.
Figure 1.4 Panel B plots the separate effects of technology adoption and
knowledge capital on fuel efficiency. The solid line presents the estimated autonomous
technology progress using similar reduced-form approach as in (Knittel, 2012).
Technology adoption and knowledge capital have resulted in 14.5 percentage points
of fuel efficiency improvement over 1986-2006, holding performance characteristics
constant.
Among the 14.5 percentage points overall improvement, adopting specific tech-
nologies is the key driver and accounts for 92% of the fuel efficiency improvements. By
19The fraction of improvements in fuel efficiency is the fraction of reduction in fuel consumption.
I measure it by − log(g), following (Knittel, 2012; Klier & Linn, 2016).
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itself, technology adoption has led to 13 percentage points of efficiency improvement
over 1986-2006. As for knowledge capital, although this framework does not include
dynamic decisions and strategic investment, results still suggest that knowledge
capital has a solid contribution to fuel efficiency. It accounts for 8% of the 14.5 per-
centage points fuel efficiency improvement, and by itself contributes to 1.5 percentage
points to fuel efficiency improvement. In a longer-run framework, knowledge capital
can have higher effects since knowledge capital may affect technology adoption in
the long run when technologies invented in patents have matured to penetrate the
market.
1.5.3 Estimation Results of Cost Structures
Adopting energy-saving technologies add financial burdens to produce a vehicle.
Panel B of Table 1.4 shows the estimated structure of the marginal cost of production
cjt(xjt, ajt, it). Results suggest that, for instance, one percent increase of the adoption
for multi-valve costs additional $92 per vehicle, and one percent increase of the
adoption for port (multiport fuel injection) costs additional $25 per car.
Although it is costly to adopt fuel-saving technologies, automakers have prof-
itability incentives to do so. Doing so, first, can raise revenues by offering fuel-efficient
vehicles, as suggested in the Estimation Section 1.5.2. For example, increasing the
adoption of multiport fuel injection by 1 percent would lead to 8 percent reduction
in fuel consumption, i.e. 8 percent increase in fuel efficiency. This fuel efficiency
improvement may attract extra demand according our demand estimation. Other
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than the revenue driven incentive, the second reason is related with fixed costs. Panel
E of Table 1.4 suggests that fixed costs are non-increasing with respect to technology
adoption. Automakers may therefore, have incentive to adopt additional technology
when they are more experienced with technology adoption.20
Developing knowledge capital is also costly. Panel D of Table 1.4 presents the
estimation results of the marginal R&D cost function ht(it). Point estimates suggest
that the R&D cost of knowledge capital is increasing and convex with respect to
knowledge capital. A partial equilibrium interpretation is that, an extra 10% patents
per firm in 2006 (compared to the average level of 32.8 patents per firm in 2006)
would cost additional R&D at $516 million a firm in 2006.21 In my framework, the
cost to invest in knowledge capital is the cost to justify the marginal returns from
doing so. Given my deterministic framework, however, this cost does not capture
the cost accounting for the uncertainty of R&D process. (I discuss the implications
and limitations of the deterministic setup in the introduction.)
The profitability incentives to increase knowledge capital are two-fold. The
most important incentive is for the sake of production cost reductions. Panel B of
Table 1.4 suggests that knowledge capital is valuable in reducing production costs.
For instance, knowledge gained from additional 10% patents leads to a $37 saving of
producing a vehicle in 2006. Interpreting the $37 per unit cost saving in the partial
equilibrium context, it is equivalent to $290 million production cost saving per firm in
20Most fixed costs are downward-sloping and weakly convex, suggesting fixed costs are diminishing
(with marginal fixed costs are increasing) with respect to with production improvement. One
exception is 5-speed gear, where the linear term λa1 is not significantly different from zero, suggesting
a flat fixed cost.
21It is roughly comparable to 0.5 percent of Honda’s revenue in 2014.
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2006, holding prices and sales constant. In addition, accumulating knowledge capital
can raise revenues by improving vehicle fuel efficiency, as in the case of technology
adoption.
In addition to technology adoption and knowledge capital, Panel B of Table
1.4 suggests that vehicles with more appealing performance characteristics are more
costly to produce. The incentive to improve performance characteristics comes from
the vehicle demand, where consumers value appealing vehicle performance.
1.6 Counterfactual Simulations
I take the structural model and analyze the consequences of three counterfactual
scenarios. In Section 1.6.1, I study the effects of a hypothetical demand shock from
an increase in gasoline taxes. I examine both the equilibrium fuel efficiency outcomes
as well as welfare effects. I study the average effects as well as distributional
effects across less fuel efficient vehicles. In Section 1.6.2, I consider a counterfactual
ownership consolidation of two automakers - GM and Chrysler in 2006. In Section
1.6.3, I investigate the consequences of a potential supply shock in R&D subsidies.
I compute counterfactual equilibrium using best-response functions (1.7)-(1.10).
Multiplicity of equilibria is a standard concern of static and dynamic games. To com-
pute desired equilibrium that is close to the observed market equilibrium, I compute
equilibrium under small shocks of gasoline taxes and R&D subsidies. Small shocks
are also unlikely to trigger radical changes that are not modeled in this framework,
such as shifts towards electric vehicles and hybrid vehicles, as well as dramatic entries
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and exits of vehicle models. For future work, I shall compute counterfactual by
iterating best-response functions which is a better method to simulate equilibrium
closed to the one played in the data but is much more computational intensive.22
Before proceeding further, here I discuss the implications of the counterfactual
results. First, my model allows me to quantify the impacts of counterfactual policies
in improving automobile fuel efficiency over 1986-2006. The nature of allowing
carmakers to choose technological specifications makes this framework suitable to
simulate medium-run counterfactuals and draw medium-run policy implications.
Second, I exclude the tax revenue collected from gasoline taxes and the fiscal
cost associated with raising R&D subsidies, when evaluating the private welfare of
gasoline taxes and R&D subsidies shocks. In addition, since the only inefficiency in
this model is imperfect competition, gasoline taxes and R&D subsidies are actually
distortionary policies and will create deadweight loss.
Last, the counterfactual exercises is suitable to simulate effects of environmental
policies and market competitiveness on fuel-efficient technological choices in 1986-
2006, given firms’ actual compliance status in Corporate Average Fuel Economy
(CAFE) standard. CAFE standard have been constant and ceased to tighten up over
1986-2006.23 My model, however, is not suitable to predict vehicle fuel efficiency in
22(Lee & Pakes, 2009) suggest that equilibria under small shocks are likely to be similar to the
observed equilibrium qualitatively and quantitatively, so that simulated equilibrium provides similar
implications. Alternatively, Aguirregabiria & Ho (2012) suggest to compute equilibrium using
Taylor approximation without strategic interaction, but is more computational intensive.
23Automakers wouldn’t necessarily have to re-adjust sales mix for small shocks. Jacobsen (2013)
documents that automakers compliance strategies towards CAFE standard over 1986-2006 are
time-invariant. They are either as as a violator, as a binding firm, or as a non-binding firm. And
their strategies to meet US fuel economy standard are unlikely to change in the medium to long
run (Jacobsen, 2013).
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the long run, especially after CAFE standard tighten up dramatically over 2012-2025.
Simulation results imply policy effects in the historical 1986-2006 time frame, in
addition to the effects of the actual CAFE standard.
1.6.1 An Increase in Gasoline Taxes
In this section, I study the effects of an increase in gasoline taxes. Gasoline taxes
have no direct effect on automakers. However, gasoline taxes may create changes
consumers’ willingness-to-pay for fuel efficiency, which in turn can create incentives
for automakers to alter product characteristics, improve fuel-saving technologies, and
adjust vehicle prices.
Over 1986-2006, gasoline prices have been taken an upward-sloping trajectory.
The tax-inclusive price has reached at $2.1 in 2006 from $1.2 in 1986 according to
(US EIA data, all in $2006 USD). The tax proportion has little changes. Federal
taxes have increased from $0.17/gallon in 1986 to $0.18 in 2006. Average state tax
has declined from $0.22 in 1986 to $0.20 in 2006 (US DOT data, all in $2006 USD).24
I consider a scenario where there is a $1/gallon increase in gasoline tax on the
new cars market in 2006. An increase of $1/gallon is not a dramatic shock. Gasoline
prices have varied by more than $1/gallon. Besides, $1/gallon gasoline tax is roughly
$100/metric tons, twice as the level of social cost of carbon.
For this counterfactual exercise, I present two cases as comparison. The
first case is the literature benchmark case. Automakers are allowed to reset the
24Federal taxes are collected from TaxFoundation.org. State taxes are collected from U.S. DOT
Federal Highway AdministrationHighway Statistics Yearbook.
43
equilibrium prices in a Bertrand game, facing changes of demand due to the shock
of the gasoline tax. Automakers will take all first-stage choices variable as given,
including performance characteristics, technologies to adopt and knowledge capital.
In the second case, I allow automakers to set prices and also choose performance
characteristics, technologies to adopt, and knowledge capital.
Table 1.6 presents the equilibrium outcomes under the $1/gallon gasoline tax.
I present the literature benchmark case in Panel I and the case allowing endogenous
product choices in Panel II. Panel A reports the equilibrium choices and Panel B
reports the equilibrium fuel efficiency outcomes.
Under the literature benchmark case, average vehicle prices increase for $50
after the tax (not weighted by sales). Figure 1.5 suggests most price increases are
among more fuel efficient vehicles, due to the higher demand of fuel-efficient vehicles.
The changes in prices cause the overall 2006 fleet fuel efficiency increases from 20.57
to 21.36 miles/gallon, with 0.85 miles/gallon improvement.
The equilibrium with endogenous product choices tells a different story. Vehicle
prices, on average, slightly decrease for $30. This is driven by the firms that engage
in more activities in knowledge capital which cause reduction in marginal costs. As
for fuel efficiency, the average model-level fuel efficiency increases from 21.06 to 21.20
miles/gallon, with 0.15 miles/gallon improvement. The 2006 fleet, however, only
increases from 20.57 to 21.04 miles/gallon, with 0.47 miles/gallon improvement.
This improvement of 0.47 miles/gallon is due to changes in the following
channels. First, as in Table 1.6, automakers marginally decrease performance
characteristics to trade-off for better fuel efficiency. Literature benchmark case
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models short-run adjustment in prices, but do not account for the fact that changes
in gasoline taxes increase consumers’ willingness-to-pay for efficiency but do not
affect not their willingness-to-pay for performance characteristics. Second, Table
1.6 suggests that automakers choose to increase technologies to adopt by 0%-1.3%,
depending on the specific technology. Third, automakers marginally invest much
more in knowledge capital, which in turn can increase fuel efficiency.
The overestimate of fuel efficiency improvement in the literature benchmark
case is driven by price effects. Figure 1.5 shows that automakers dramatically increase
the prices for more fuel-efficient cars and decrease the prices for less fuel-efficient cars.
This effect works against increasing the sales-weighted fleet average fuel efficiency.
Table 1.7 presents the distributional effects. I summarize the unweighted price
and fuel efficiency (in miles-per-gallon) across fuel efficiency group, market segment
group, and technology group. First, Panel A shows that vehicles with original low
efficiency see an reduction of price by 2.3k and a reduction of fuel efficiency by 0.1
mpg. Relatively efficient vehicles see a price increase by 2.4 k and fuel efficiency
improvement by 0.39 mpg. This type of fuel efficiency polarization is consistent
with Klier et al. (2016). As for distributional effect across market segments in Panel
B, vehicles in the car segment get more expensive by 1.8k and more efficient by
0.34 mpg, whereas light-duty trucks become 2.4 less expensive and 0.08 mpg less
efficient. Last, I present the distributional effects across firms’ technology groups in
Panel C. Although firms with different technology background may have improve fuel
efficiency differently, I find that vehicle efficiency improves at a similar pace among
Japanese manufacturers, US manufacturers and European and other manufacturers.
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Compared to other vehicles, US vehicles become cheaper, but this can be explained
by the fact that US firms in general take the low efficiency part of the market
segment. According to Panel A, these less efficient cars will see a price reduction as
a result of a gasoline tax increase.
To evaluate the change of welfare after a shock, I compute changes in consumer
surplus25. I exclude the present value of future cost savings from using more fuel-
efficient cars when evaluating consumer welfare. In addition to consumer welfare, I
present changes in producer surplus, and potential externality changes in social cost
of carbon dioxide.
Table 1.8 presents the welfare implications in both the short-run scenario and
in the medium-run scenario. Both scenarios suggest that an increase in gasoline
tax decreases consumers’ welfare due to dollars-per-gallon goes up. Both scenarios
also suggest that this shock increases producers’ welfare since markups increases.
However, the welfare distributions between consumers and producers are different.
Not allowing automakers to improve fuel efficiency when facing a gasoline price shock,
the consumers’ welfare lost is predicted to be $1.57 billion. This is slightly higher
than the case allowing endogenous technology improvements, in which consumers’
surplus decreases by $1.56 billion. As for the producers’ surplus, short-run simulation
suggests a higher increase of variable profits both due to the higher price automakers
charge, and due to not accounting for cost burden from adopting costly technologies.
25I use compensating variation suggested in (Rosen & Small, 1981) to compute the consumer








the marginal utility of income forgone from purchasing a vehicle.
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Allowing firms to choose technologies and other product characteristics, an increase
of gasoline tax at $1/gallon suggests the variable profits would increase by $1.44
billion, producers’ surplus to increase by $0.6 billion and the overall private welfare
will decrease by $0.97 billion.
Following EPA’s GHG equivalencies calculator, the improvement of 0.47
miles/gallon implies a 0.9 million metric tons CO2 saved per year.26 This amount
of CO2 emission reduction is equivalent to putting 0.2 million vehicles off the road
per year, which is higher than 1 percent of new car sales in 2006. This efficiency
improvement in the 2006 fleet further implies a total $0.4 billion social benefit from
carbon emission reduction over the next 15 years, evaluated at $40/metric tons CO2.
27
My results agree with existing studies that gasoline taxes have positive effects
on fleet average fuel efficiency (Gramlich, 2010). Neglecting the choices that au-
tomakers can make other than prices, however, would over predict the fuel-efficient
improvement. In addition, I would neglect the distributional effects across consumers
buying different fuel-efficient vehicles, and overstate the benefit private welfare.
1.6.2 Consequences of Reducing Competition
In this section, I address the impact of imperfect competition on the vehicle
market. Specifically, I investigates what would have happened to technologies
26Following EPA’s GHG Equivalencies Calculator Website, I assume the average vehicle miles
travelled (VMT) per car holds at original 2006 level, 11,318 miles per year.
27I assume all cars have a 15 years of lifetime. I evaluate the lifetime social benefit using 6%
discount rate and $40/metric tons social cost of carbon following EPA’s Social Cost of Carbon
website.
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adopted, patents applied, vehicle performance characteristics, vehicle prices, and fuel
efficiency if the GM and Chrysler had been merged in 2006.
Evaluating the fuel efficiency consequences (hence also environmental conse-
quences) is important when evaluating an anti-trust policy but is rarely studied.
Existing literature on industrial organization focus on the welfare changes due to
increase in the market power from ownership consolidations and all types of imperfect
competition. Emerging industrial organization studies have started to incorporate
endogenous product characteristics to analyze the effects of market consolidation
(Fan, 2013). In this section, I would like to address, in addition to the channel of
changes of market power, what the effects of reducing competition are in terms of
technology improvement of energy efficiency and discouraging production quality
improvement.
The effects of imperfect competition on technological improvement is ambiguous.
Aghion et al. (2005) find that competition and innovation intensity have an inverse
U-shape relation. Monopolists do not have competitive pressure to innovate while
intense competition means firms may lack the resource or extra profit for the innovator
may be competed away too quickly to be worthwhile. This section relates to existing
theoretical work by empirically simulating the effects of reducing competition in
automobile industry.
As major US automakers, Chrysler and GM are direct competitors. Chrysler
owns 70 models over 1986-2006 sold under 5 makes including Chrysler, Dodge,
Plymouth, etc.. GM produce and sell 123 models over 1986-2006 sold under 9 makes
including Buick, Chevy, GMC, Saturn, etc.. Chrysler and GM have been rumored to
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merger in 2008, but they have never actually consolidated. I consider a hypothetical
merger that would happen in new cars market in 2006.
Table 1.11 presents the average simulated choices, responding to the shock.
Table 1.11 suggests merging firms and other firms respond differently. The outcomes
on product characteristics and technology adoption are intuitive. Merged firms
choose to offer products with lower quality. The cars they offer come with worse
performance characteristics and with lower adoption rates of fuel-saving technologies.
Merging firms, to our surprise, would like to patent slightly more. A reasonable
explanation could be the following. After merger, GM and Chrysler have higher
incentive to increase knowledge capital since one patent could benefit more lines of
vehicles they produce. Besides, after ownership consolidation, GM and Chrysler are
able to share the fixed cost of increasing knowledge capital together.
As for the pricing strategy, merging firms increase their markup for $241 dollars.
The prices they charge, however, are contrary to what a short-run simulation would
predict. Merged firms mark down vehicles prices for $142 per car. An explanation is
that the effects of the production cost reductions from offering inferior products and
from improving knowledge capital dominates the effect from gain of market power.
Figure 1.7 suggests that merging automakers reduce vehicle prices compared to other
players in the economy.
Table 1.12 presents the equilibrium outcome by market segment. Panel A shows
the counterfactual price and fuel efficiency. Panel B summarizes the market specialty
of Chrysler and GM compare to one of their biggest competition Ford. First, Panel A
suggests that vehicles sold by the merged firms are become less fuel efficient, except
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for large and luxury cars. This is consistent with Panel B, which suggests that Ford
takes much larger market share in this market segment. If Chrysler and GM merge,
they will still have to maintain, if not improve their product quality. Second, the
two merged firms sell less efficient Vans and Pickups, but only marginally so.
Results suggest that when evaluating anti-trust issues on energy-related prod-
ucts such as vehicle and large residential appliance in the medium run, it is important
to account of potential environmental consequence in energy savings and potential
welfare consequence from quality improvement. The possibility that merged firms can
share their knowledge capital suggest a source of benefit from market consolidation.
1.6.3 An Increase in R&D Subsidies
In this section, I analyze the effects of an increase in R&D subsidies. R&D
subsidies would potentially make the research development process less costly, thus
creating incentives for firms to engage in more activities in increasing knowledge
capital. In most endogenous technological change literature, R&D subsidies are
designed to provide long-run incentives of innovation. In this static framework with
endogenous product choices, my counterfactual results should capture a proportion
of the overall effects of R&D subsidies
I consider a potential shock in R&D subsidies, where all automakers face a
25% reduction in the marginal cost of developing knowledge capital. Specifically,
instead of facing λ2 in the marginal R&D function ht(it) = λ1 + λ2it + F itype + T i,
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automakers would face ht(it) = λ1 + λ2(1 − 25%)it + F itype + T i as their new cost
structure.
Over 1986-2006, US public R&D expenditures in the transportation sector
have increased from $107 million in 1986 to $317 million in 2006 (IEA data, $2006
USD). The annual increment rate is 25.4%, ranging from -40% to 100%. In 2007, US
public R&D expenditure have increased to $409 million, equivalent to 29% increase
from 2006 level.
Table 1.9 presents the simulated outcomes responding to the 25% increase in
R&D subsidies. I present equilibrium results in the case of choosing price only in
Panel I, as well as in the case considering endogenous product choices in Panel II. I
report equilibrium choices in Panel A and corresponding fuel efficiency results in
Panel B.
First and for most, Table 1.9 suggests automakers apply for additional 12.1
patents per year, which is equivalent to an average of cost savings at $81.1 of
producing a vehicle according to my estimation results. Besides patenting activities,
that automakers have marginally less incentives to adopt better technologies and
improve performance characteristics as in Table 1.9. The magnitudes of these impacts,
however, are negligible. Last, Table 1.9 suggests vehicles prices drop by $95 dollars.
Prices drop uniformly across different fuel-efficient vehicles (See Figure 1.6).
On average, a vehicle model is slightly more efficient, increasing from 21.06
to 21.12 miles/gallon, with only 0.06 miles/gallon improvement. Although the fuel-
efficiency improvement is small at model level, the improvement at fleet level is much
larger, from 20.57 to 21.40 miles/gallon, with 0.83 miles/gallon improvement.
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As for the welfare implication, Table 1.10 suggests that a R&D subsidy would
increase both consumers’ welfare and producers’ welfare. On one hand, consumers’
welfare marginally increases for $0.02 billion. The fact that consumers only marginally
benefit from a R&D subsidy in the medium run is because knowledge capital has
limited fuel efficiency benefits in the medium run, and because technology adoption
decreases in this case. The main driver of the increase of consumer surplus comes
from the price reduction channel. On the other hand, automakers make profits from
the production cost savings due to increase in knowledge capital. Firms in total
see an increase in the variable profits for $2.3 billion, and overall profits for $0.85
billion in 2006. Accounting for welfare changes for both consumers and producers,
the R&D subsidy studied in this exercise results in an increase of private welfare of
$0.88 billion in 2006.
Ignoring the choices of knowledge capital will lead to incorrect evaluations in
the effects of R&D subsidies in the transportation sector. Not only will l miss to
include the fuel-efficiency benefit from a R&D subsidiary policy, I will also neglect
the consumer welfare gain from using more fuel-efficient cars and from paying less for
a vehicle. In addition, for producer’s surplus, I will miss to include the cost savings
raised from such a R&D subsidy.
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1.7 Robustness and Additional Results
I perform multiple robust checks in addition to the baseline estimation. Con-
cerning on some assumptions in the identification are too strong, I try alternative
specifications to relax those assumptions. Results are included in Online Appendix.
To identify the parameters in the demand system and to correctly predict
marginal cost, I assume the demand unobservables are not efficiency-related and all
characteristics related with fuel efficiency are picked up fuel cost fp · gh. In Table
C.1 Column (4), I include both technology adoption and knowledge capital to test
this assumption. Results suggest that I cannot separately identify the coefficient of
fuel cost (dollar/mile) from fuel efficiency technology variables. It suggests that it is
reasonable to make the above assumption and demand parameters are identified.
Table C.1 includes alternative specifications for the marginal cost of production
function. Column (1) shows that the demand is inelastic with respect to vehicle
price and fuel cost in OLS. It suggests that a gasoline tax (or carbon tax) has
the potential to induce innovation and technology adoption through the channel of
shifting demand towards fuel-efficient vehicles. Column (3) includes an alternative
specification. I test if consumers make purchasing choices including the technology
adoption and innovation. Results suggest that effects of technology adoption and
innovation cannot be separately identified from the effect of fuel cost. It provides
suggestive evidences that it is reasonable to assume that fuel efficiency and vehicle
performance variables fully capture all efficiency-related quality. And demand error
only contains non-efficiency related quality.
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Table C.2 includes alternative specifications of the fuel efficiency frontier,
including a specification using a literature benchmark specification. In Column (1),
I estimate the frontier equation allowing fuel efficiency to have trade-off relation
with performance, but not allowing the frontier to have different intercept over time.
In Column (2), I estimate a well-adopted specification in the literature. I estimate
the same trade-off frontier, but allowing the intercepts varies over time using a year
fixed effect. The estimated year fixed effect is often referred to as the fuel efficiency
frontier in the literature. In Column (3), I include the benchmark case. I will refer
to θaa+ θii as the fuel efficiency frontier. The basic estimation in Column (1) does
not pick up the trade-off quite well compared to Column (2) and (3). Our baseline
performs as good as the conventional frontier estimates in terms of goodness of
fit, yet also with the benefit to allow me to see how different types of technology
improvement contributes to the frontier.
In addition, I perform robustness checks using different parameters of deprecia-
tion rate δ, which is 20% in the baseline estimation. I show how results could alter
in an extreme case of zero depreciation in Table C.2 Column (4), Table C.3 Column
(5), and Table C.4 Column (4). I do find in the of lower depreciation rate (0%),
that the marginal efficiency gain from additional patents is lower (Table C.2), and
that the marginal cost reduction of producing a vehicle is lower (Table C.3). The
reason is lower depreciation rate leads to higher existing pool of knowledge so that
marginal returns in all channels are lower. Table C.4 also suggests that the marginal
cost of increasing knowledge stock is lower. The reason is I use spillovers stocks and
cross-categories knowledge stocks to predict current effort of developing knowledge
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capital i. With higher existing knowledge, it is less difficult for firms to expand their
knowledge pool and innovate for more patents. Nonetheless, the qualitative results
do not change even in this extreme case.
1.8 Concluding Remarks
Incorporating technological changes is important for understanding the optimal
environmental policies needed to combat climate change problems in the medium
to long run. However, the link between environmental policies and the different
technological choices have not been empirically established. To understand how
different types of technological changes respond to environmental policies, this
study examines the roles of adopting well-developed technologies versus increasing
knowledge capital in improving fuel efficiency and affecting welfare. Using the
automobile industry as an example, this paper finds that technology adoption is
more sensitive to gasoline prices, whereas knowledge capital responds more to R&D
subsidies in the medium run. This paper also highlights two channels of knowledge
capital. Increasing knowledge about energy-efficient technologies not only has fuel
efficiency benefits, but it also comes with production cost savings.
Carbon policies are designed to combat greenhouse gas emissions in the medium
to long run. For this reason, medium-run predictions are more suitable than short-run
models for understanding how improvements in low-carbon technologies respond
to environmental policies. Moreover, short-run models may overstate the effects
of environmental policies on equilibrium outcomes by overstating price effects. To
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simulate how gasoline taxes, R&D subsidies, and market competitiveness affect
fuel efficiency and private welfare, I set up a structural model of technological
improvements of the new vehicle market in the US.
My empirical findings suggest that gasoline taxes and R&D subsidies not
only trigger different incentives, but these two policies have different fuel efficiency
outcomes and implications. To achieve fuel efficiency improvements in the medium
run, gasoline taxes are more effective since technology adoption has much greater
medium-run fuel efficiency benefits. If, however, the goal is to help automakers
become more productive, lower their costs in producing fuel efficient cars, then R&D
subsidies are more suitable.
There are many directions in which this study can be extended and re-evaluated
for future work. First, this study captures what elements automakers can adjust in
addition to short-run price changes, but not what automakers can adjust in the long
run. Incorporating radical technological changes (e.g., from conventional internal
combustion engine vehicles to hybrid and electric cars) is important for understanding
the long-run effects of policy instruments. Second, this study highlights the two
channels by which knowledge capital may affect welfare. This framework, however,
does not aim to investigate R&D investment strategies facing uncertain outcomes.
Addressing these channels my be an important extension for future research.
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Tables
Table 1.1: Summary Statistics, 1986-2006
Var Description Mean SD
A. Basic Characteristics
ph Manufacturer suggested retail price (MSRP) in 10k 2006 USD 3.27 2.19
sh ·M Sales in 100k 0.78 0.99
gh Fuel efficiency: fuel consumption rate (gallon/mile), i.e. 1/mpgh 0.05 0.01
fph Fuel price: dollar/gallon in 2006 USD 1.25 0.31
fph · gh Fuel cost: dollar/mile in 2006 USD 0.06 0.02
Xh,hpw Performance: Horsepower-to-weight 0.05 0.02
Xh,w Performance: Weight (metric tons) 1.54 0.34
B. Technology
ah,5g 5 speed gear 0.65 0.34
ah,vvt Variable valve timing (VVT) 0.17 0.37
ah,mv Multiple valve (#valve>2) 0.48 0.49
ah,mfi Port (MFI) 0.88 0.32
aoldh,cb Grandfathered tech: Carburetor 0.04 0.18
aoldh,tbi Grandfathered tech: Throttle body injection (TBI) 0.09 0.28
aoldh,a0lk Grandfathered tech:Auto trans. w/o lockup 0.29 0.28
aoldh,3g Grandfathered tech:3 speed gear 0.53 0.38
alrh,4wd Longer-run tech: 4-wheel-drive/all-wheel-drive 0.19 0.31
C. Knowledge Capital
ift Number of patents applied for conventional engines (in 100) 0.47 0.74
kift Accumulated knowledge capital for conventional engines (in 100) 2.01 2.85
Skift Spilled accumu. knowledge cap. for conventional engines (in 100) 7.24 9.54
kiafvft Accumulated knowledge capital for AFV† engines (in 100) 0.59 1.27
Skiafvft Spilled accumu. knowledge capital for AFV engines (in 100) 1.82 3.20
D. Observations
Number of Model-Years 3791
Number of Models 502
Number of Brands 45
Number of Companies 23
Number of Segments 7
Number of Years 21
Note: †AFV engine: Alternative Fuel Vehicle engines. See Appendix A.3 for definitions.
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Table 1.2: Knowledge Capital: Number of Patents Applied, 1986-2006
Category Count
A. Engine Tech for Internal Combustion Engines
1.1 Variable Valve Timing (VVT) and Var. Val. Tim. and Lift (VVLT) 1,398
1.2 Integrated Starter/Generator (ISG) 15
1.3 Cylinder Deactivation (CD) 202
1.4 Direct Fuel Injection (DFI/GDI) 682
1.5 Turbocharger 373
1.6 Supercharger 229
1.7 Other, Improved Fuel Efficiency 5,229
1.8 Other, Uncategorized Engine Technologies 11,697
Total 14,595
B. Engine Tech for Alternative Fuel Vehicles (AFV) Engines
2.1 Electric Vehicles 863
2.2 Hybrid Vehicles 381
2.3 Hydrogen Vehicles/Fuel Cells 6,661
Total 7,859
35,464
Note: The count stands for the total number of weighted patent applied in each category. Source:
OECD TPF Database. Definition of each broad categories is on Appendix A.3. Definition of each
sub-category is available upon request.
Table 1.3: Suggestive Evidence: Gasoline Prices and Competitiveness
Gasoline Prices Competitiveness
(HHI)
Knowledge Capital Stock -0.40 -0.26
Technology Adoption
5 Gear Trans. 0.72 -0.52
Var. Valve Timing 0.89 -0.52
Multi. Valve -0.65 0.54
Port (MFI) -0.62 0.67
Note: 1. All variables (knowledge capital, technology adoption, gasoline prices, and HHI) are
detrended.
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Table 1.4: Estimation Results
(Table continues next page)
Parameters Estimates Standard Errors
A. Demand Side Parameters ln(share)
αp: Price Veh. Price, $10k, 2006 USD -0.5483*** (0.1134)
αg: Fuel Cost Dollar/Mile, 2006 USD -17.9060*** (6.3303)
αx: Veh. Performance Char. ln(Weight) 1.7077*** (0.4448)
ln(Horsepower/Weight) 1.0533*** (0.3353)
σseg: Segment Similarity ln(share|seg) 0.4949*** (0.0881)
Model by Year FE Yes
B. Marginal Cost of Production cjt(xjt, ajt, it)
γx : Performance Char. ln(Weight) 4.8700*** (0.3141)
ln(Hp/Weight) 2.3446*** (0.3967)
γa: Technology Adoption 5 Gear Trans. 1.3018*** (0.1464)
Var. Valve Timing 0.2542 (0.2376)
Multi. Valve 0.9221*** (0.1623)
Port (MFI) 0.2547** (0.1163)
γi: Innovation Ki: Knowledge Stock -0.0668*** (0.0160)
(100 Engine Patents)
γ0: Constant 2.7747* (1.3542)
Segment FE, Year FE Yes
C. Fuel Efficiency Technology Frontier: Fuel Consumption Rate gj(xjt, ajt, it)
θx: Performance Trade-off ln(Weight) 0.4962*** (0.0102)
ln(Horsepower/Weight) 0.2412*** (0.0084)
θa: Technology adoption 5 Gear Transmission -0.0716*** (0.0051)
Var. Valve Timing (VVT) -0.0450*** (0.0053)
Multi. Valve (#valve>2) -0.0875*** (0.0043)
Port (MFI) -0.0846*** (0.0054)
θi: Innovation Ki: Knowledge Stock -0.0090*** (0.0009)
(100 Engine Patents)
θ0 : Constant -2.7074*** (0.0330)
Segment FE, Make FE Yes
D. Marginal R&D Cost of Innovation ht(it) in ($Billion 2006 USD)
λ1: Slope of R&D cost Constant 12.1032*** (2.2785)
λ2: Slope of R&D cost i: Knowledge Flow i 8.3001*** (1.9750)
(100 Engine Patents)
λjp: Japanese Mfr. -10.3401*** (2.3793)
λus: US Mfr. 60.0487*** (3.0349)
λ0: Constant -0.4044*** (0.1608)
Time Trend Yes
Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 1.4: Estimation Results (cont.)
Parameters Estimates Standard Errors
E.1 Marginal fixed cost associated with technology adoption: F ajt(ajt)
5 Gear Transmission
φa11 : Slope of fixed cost Constant -0.1016 (0.1563)
φa12 : Slope of fixed cost 5 Gear Transmission -0.5286*** (0.0954)
Company FE, Time Trend Yes
Var. Valve Timing (VVT)
φa21 : Slope of fixed cost Constant -0.0722** (0.0294)
φa22 : Slope of fixed cost Var. Valve Timing (VVT) 0.0097 (0.0263)
Company FE, Time Trend Yes
Multi. Valve (#valve>2)
φa31 : Slope of fixed cost Constant -0.3118*** (0.1087)
φa32 : Slope of fixed cost Multi. Valve (#valve>2) 0.1703*** (0.0877)
Company FE, Time Trend Yes
Port (MFI)
φa41 : Slope of fixed cost Constant -0.0878** (0.0305)
φa42 : Slope of fixed cost Port (MFI) 0.0253 (0.0153)
Company FE, Time Trend Yes
E.2 Marginal fixed cost associated with performance: F xjt(xjt)
Weight
φx11 : Slope of fixed cost Constant -1.7416*** (0.2773)
φx12 : Slope of fixed cost ln(Weight) 1.1965*** (0.1752)
Company FE, Time Trend Yes
Horsepower-to-weight
φx21 : Slope of fixed cost Constant 1.2406*** (0.1934)
φx22 : Slope of fixed cost ln(Hp/Weight) 0.4286*** (0.0588)
Company FE, Time Trend Yes
Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Note: This table reports baseline estimated parameters for the demand system, cost structure
equations, and the fuel efficiency frontier equation. Panel A: Demand is estimated using a Nested
Logit demand. Panel B: Model-level marginal costs of production are derived and estimated using
automakers’ first order condition w.r.t price under the assumption of Bertrand-Nash equilibrium.
Panel C: Fuel economy frontier are estimated using a nonlinear least square. Panel D: Firm-level
marginal costs of accumulating knowledge capital are derived from first order condition w.r.t.
knowledge capital. Panel E: Model-level fixed costs of adopting technologies and improving
performance are derived from first order condition w.r.t. technology adoption and first order
condition w.r.t performance characteristics.
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Table 1.5: Willingness-to-Pay for 1% Fuel Efficiency Improvement in 2006
Passenger Cars Light-duty Trucks
Small Medium Lrg./Lux CUV SUV Van Pickup
Fuel Efficiency (miles/gal.) 29.8 24.0 22.0 21.7 17.1 19.4 17.0
Fuel Efficiency 30.1 24.2 22.2 21.9 17.3 19.6 17.2
with 1% Improvement
Willingness-to-Pay for 1% Fuel Efficiency Improvement (in 2006 USD)
with 2006 gas price 229 236 281 289 464 361 469
($2.13/gallon)
with $0.5 gas tax shock 283 292 347 356 573 445 579
($2.63/gallon)
additional WTP 54 56 66 67 109 84 110
Note: 1. Fuel efficiency in 2006 are the sales-weighted fuel efficiency. 2. Willingness-to-pay is
computed holding price and characteristics fixed.
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Table 1.6: Simulation I: A $1/gallon Increase in Gasoline Tax in 2006
Equilibrium Outcomes
Scenario I: Choose p Scenario II: Choose {p, x, a, i}
Actual Sim. Diff. Actual Sim. Diff.
A. Equilibrium Choices
p: Price (2006 USD) 35,435 35,485 50 35,435 35,405 -30
x: Performance Characteristics (log)
Weight 1.347 1.346 -0.001
Hp/Weight -2.812 -2.812 -0.000
a: Tech. Adopt Rate (Percent)
5 Gear Trans 42.4 42.4 0.0
Var. Val. Timing 58.8 60.0 1.3
Multi. Valve 77.6 77.8 0.2
Port (MFI) 100.0 100.0 0.1
i: Knowl. (# of Patents) 32.88 33.61 0.73
B. Fuel Efficiency (miles/gallon)
Unweighted Average 21.05 21.05 0.00 21.05 21.20 0.15
2006 Fleet Average 20.57 21.42 0.85 20.57 21.04 0.47
Note: 2006 Fleet average is sales weighted, computed using harmonic mean.
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Table 1.7: Simulation I: A $1/gallon Increase in Gasoline Tax in 2006
Distributional Effects
Actual Sim. Diff. Actual Sim. Diff.
Panel A. By Original MPG Efficiency Distribution
1: Efficiency < Mean 2: Efficiency ≥ Mean
Price (2006 USD) 42,920 40,575 -2,345 27,950 30,235 2,385
Fuel Efficiency, Unweighted 18.01 17.92 -0.10 24.09 24.48 0.39
Panel B. By Segment
1. Passenger Cars 2. Light Duty Trucks
Price (2006 USD) 37,843 39,707 1,863 32,474 30,117 -2,357
Fuel Efficiency, Unweighted 22.96 23.30 0.34 18.70 18.62 -0.08
Panel C. By Technology Group
1. Japanese Mfr. 2. European & Other
Price (2006 USD) 29,001 30,345 1,343 58,183 59,790 1,607
Fuel Efficiency, Unweighted 22.39 22.57 0.18 20.38 20.60 0.22
3. US Mfr.
Price (2006 USD) 32,134 30,709 -1,426
Fuel Efficiency, Unweighted 20.04 20.23 0.18
Note: Fuel Economy here is unweighted miles-per-gallon. It does not reflect the sales weighted fleet
average fuel economy.
Table 1.8: Simulation I: A $1/gallon Increase in Gasoline Tax in 2006
Panel A. Welfare Effects
Items Scenario I Scenario II
Choose p Choose {p, x, a, i}
A. Welfare ($Billion, 2006 USD):
∆Consumers Surplus -1.5680 -1.5639
∆Profits
∆Variable Profit 3.3642 1.4417
∆Fixed Costs 0 -0.2432
∆R&D Costs 0 1.0886
∆Total Private Welfare 1.7962 -0.9676
Externalities
∆CO2 Savings 0.0045 0.0034
∆Total Welfare 1.8007 -0.9642
B. Other Cost Components (in $):
∆Markup/Vehicle 50 92
∆Marginal Cost/Vehicle 0 -122
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Table 1.9: Simulation II: A 25% Reduction in Marginal R&D Cost in 2006
Equilibrium Outcomes
Scenario I: Choose p Scenario II: Choose {p, x, a, i}
Actual Sim. Diff. Actual Sim. Diff.
A. Equilibrium Choices
p: Price (2006 USD) 35,435 35,435 0 35,435 35,340 -95
x: Performance Characteristics (log)
Weight 1.347 1.347 0.000
Hp/Weight -2.812 -2.817 -0.001
a: Tech. Adopt Rate (Percent)
5 Gear Trans 42.41 42.41 -0.00
Var. Val. Timing 58.77 59.03 0.26
Multi. Valve 77.56 77.55 -0.01
Port (MFI) 100.0 99.96 -0.04
i: Knowl. (# of Patents) 32.88 45.09 12.21
B. Fuel Efficiency (miles/gallon)
Unweighted Average 21.051 21.051 0.000 21.051 21.114 0.063
2006 Fleet Average 20.569 20.569 0.000 20.569 20.572 0.003
Note: 2006 Fleet average is sales weighted, computed using harmonic mean.
Table 1.10: Simulation II: A 25% Reduction in Marginal R&D Cost in 2006
Welfare Effects
Items Scenario I Scenario II
Choose p Choose {p, x, a, i}
A. Welfare ($Billion, 2006 USD):
∆Consumers Surplus 0 0.0220
∆Profits
∆Variable Profit 0 2.2696
∆Fixed Costs 0 0.0164
∆R&D Costs 0 1.3987
∆Total Private Welfare 0 0.8765
Externalities
∆CO2 Savings 0 0.0006
∆ Total Welfare 0 0.8777
B. Other Cost Components (in $):
∆Markup/Vehicle 0 130
∆Marginal Cost/Vehicle 0 -224
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Table 1.11: Simulation III: Merger of GM and Chrysler in 2006
Equilibrium Outcomes
Type Scenario I: Choose p Scenario II: Choose {p, x, a, i}
of firms Actual Sim. Diff. Actual Sim. Diff.
A. Equilibrium Choices
p: Price (2006 USD) 35,435 36,059 625 35,435 35,684 249
Merged 32,039 33,886 1,847 32,039 31,897 -142
Other 36,884 39,987 103 36,884 37,299 415
x: Performance Characteristics (log)
Weight 1.3467 1.3465 0.0002
Hp/Weight -2.8122 -2.8118 0.0004
Weight Merged 1.3997 1.3915 -0.0082
Hp/Weight Merged -2.8241 -2.8280 -0.0039
Weight Other 1.3241 1.3273 0.0036
Hp/Weight Other -2.8073 -2.8049 0.0024
a: Tech. Adopt Rate (Percent)
5 Gear Trans 42.41 42.41 0.00
Var. Val. Timing 58.77 59.13 0.36
Multi. Valve 77.55 77.56 0.01
Port (MFI) 100.00 100.00 0.00
5 Gear Trans Merged 28.85 30.00 1.19
Var. Val. Timing Merged 31.02 21.31 -9.71
Multi. Valve Merged 45.86 43.25 -2.61
Port (MFI) Merged 100.00 95.45 -4.55
5 Gear Trans Other 48.19 47.68 -0.51
Var. Val. Timing Other 70.61 75.27 4.66
Multi. Valve Other 91.11 92.20 1.12
Port (MFI) Other 100.00 100.00 2.00
i: Knowl. (# of Patents) 32.89 32.89 0.00
Merged 3.79 3.92 0.13
Other 36.52 36.50 -0.02
B. Fuel Efficiency (miles/gallon)
Unweighted Average 21.05 21.05 0.000 21.05 21.06 0.01
2006 Fleet Average 20.57 22.97 2.40 20.57 20.52 -0.05
Merged 19.03 19.59 0.56 19.03 18.87 -0.16
Other 21.54 24.14 2.63 21.54 21.56 0.02
Note: 2006 Fleet average is sales weighted, computed using harmonic mean.
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Table 1.12: Simulation I: A $1/gallon Increase in Gasoline Tax in 2006
Distributional Effects
Panel A. Equilibrium Outcome By Segment
Actual Sim. Diff. Actual Sim. Diff.
1. Small Car 2. Medium Car
Price (2006 USD) 16,097 15,915 -183 23.331 23.173 -157
Fuel Efficiency 28.48 28.34 -0.14 23.33 23.17 -0.16
3. Large/Lux Car 4. Crossover (CUV)
Price (2006 USD) 23,986 23,693 -293 27,061 26,286 -775
Fuel Efficiency 19.69 19.71 0.02 21.32 21.14 -0.18
5. Sport Utility (SUV) 6. Vans
36,403 35,846 -557 27,533 27,073 -459
16.82 16.69 -0.13 19.20 19.11 -0.08
7. Pickup Trucks
Price (2006 USD) 30,796 30,720 -73
Fuel Efficiency 17.61 17.54 -0.07
Note: Fuel efficiency reported above are unweighted, distinct from fleet
average fuel efficiency.
Panel B. Sales of Merged Firms (Chrysler and GM), and Ford by Segment
Selected Firms Sales in 2006 (in 100k)
1. Small Car 2. Medium Car 3. Large/Lux Car
Chrysler 0 1.52 0.81
GM 2.86 6.96 1.63
Ford 1.58 2.16 3.83
4. CUV 5. SUV 6. Vans
Chrysler 2.18 4.76 3.72
GM 2.47 5.62 2.02









Figure 1.1: Technologies Penetrated the Vehicle Market: 1986-2006

































Note: Technology penetration rates are computed as unweighted average.
Source: EPA Fuel Economy Guide Data and EPA Fuel Economy Trend Data.
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Figure 1.2: Changes of Vehicle Characteristics, 1986-2006






















Note: This figure plots the fraction changes (as in logarithm terms) of fuel efficiency (gallon/mile),
weight, horsepower since 1986.
Figure 1.3: Grandfathered Technologies Exited from the Market, 1986-2006

































Note: Technology penetration rates are computed as unweighted average.
Source: EPA Fuel Economy Guide Data and EPA Fuel Economy Trend Data.
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Figure 1.4: Fuel Efficiency Improvement from Innovation and Technology Adoption
Panel A. Effects of Performance and Technology on Fuel Efficiency


































Panel B. Effects of Technology Adoption and Knowledge Capital on Fuel Efficiency

































Note: Fraction of Changes in Fuel Efficiency is − ln(gallon/mile).
Panel A plots effects of performance and technology improvement on fuel efficiency, using estimates
from g(x, a, i) = exp{θ0 + θx,hpw lnxhpw︸ ︷︷ ︸+ θx,wt lnxwt︸ ︷︷ ︸+ θaa+ θii}︸ ︷︷ ︸+ε.
Panel B plots effects of technology adoption and knowledge capital on fuel efficiency, using estimates
from g(x, a, i) = exp{θ0 + θx lnx+ θaa︸︷︷︸+ θii︸︷︷︸}+ ε.
Panel B also plots the autonomous technology frontier on fuel efficiency improvement is obtained
from g(x, Tt) = exp{θ0 + θx lnx+ Tt︸︷︷︸}+ ε as comparison.
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Figure 1.5: Simulation I: A $1/gallon Increase in Gasoline Tax in 2006
Scenario I. Choose Price p
$10k 2006 USD


































Group 2: Fuel Efficiency(MPG) > Mean
Actual Price
Simulated Price
Scenario II. Choose {p, x, a, i}
$10k 2006 USD





























Group 2: Fuel Efficiency(MPG) > Mean
Actual Price
Simulated Price
Figure 1.6: Simulation II: A 25% Reduction in Marginal R&D Cost in 2006
$10k 2006 USD





































Figure 1.7: Simulation III: Merger of GM and Chrysler in 2006
Panel A. Scenario I. Choose Price p
$10k 2006 USD
































Group 2: Merging Firms (Chrylser and GM)
Actual Price
Simulated Price
B. Scenario II. Choose {p, x, a, i}
$10k 2006 USD






































A.1 Data Sources and Definitions of Variables
Table A.1: Data Description and Sources
Var Data Description Source
A. Basic Vehicle Characteristics
ph Manufacturer suggested retail price (MSRP) in 10k
2006 USD
Ward’s Auto
sh Market share Ward’s Auto
sh|seg Market share in the segment Ward’s Auto
Xh,hpw Performance: Horsepower-to-weight Automotive News
Xh,w Performance: Weight (metric tons) Automotive News
gh Fuel consumption rate (Gallon/mile), i.e. 1mpg EPA FE Guide




ah,5g 5 speed gear EPA FE Guide
ah,vvt Variable valve timing (VVT) EPA FE Trend
ah,mv Multiple valve (#valve>2) EPA FE Trend
ah,mfi Port (MFI) EPA FE Trend
aoldh,cb Grandfathered tech: Carburetor EPA FE Trend
aoldh,tbi Grandfathered tech: Throttle body injection (TBI) EPA FE Trend
aoldh,a0lk Grandfathered tech:Auto trans. w/o lockup EPA FE Guide
aoldh,3g Grandfathered tech:3 speed gear EPA FE Guide
alrh,4wd Longer-run tech: 4-wheel-drive/all-wheel-drive EPA FE Guide
C. Knowledge Capital
ift Number of patents applied for conventional internal
combustion engines
OECD TPF, Citation
kift Accumulated knowledge capital for internal combustion
engines
OECD TPF, Citation
kiafvft Accumulated knowledge capital for alternative fuel
vehicle(AFV) engines
OECD TPF, Citation
Skift Spilled accumulated knowledge capital for internal
combustion engines
OECD TPF, Citation
Skiafvft Spilled accumulated knowledge capital for AFV engines OECD TPF, Citation
Technology Adoption.- Data are collected from EPA Fuel Economy Guide Data.
I supplement technology adoption variables using EPA Fuel Economy Trend Data.
Selection of trendy technologies over 1986-2006 is based on EPA Fuel Economy Trend
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Report (2008; 2013; 2014). The Guide data is the public version of Trend data
with much fewer variables. Therefore, matching two data set causes very minimum
inconsistency.
Knowledge Capital.- Appendix A.3 for detail.
Segment.- There are 7 segments-small car, medium car, large/luxury car,
crossover, SUV, van, and pickup trucks.
Company.-Each company is a parent company including one brand to multiple
brands. Knowledge capital varies at company level. There are 23 companies-
AMC, BMW, Chrysler, Daewoo, Daimler, Fiat, Ford, GM, Honda, Hyundai, Isuzu,
Mazda, Mitsubishi, Nissan, Peugeot, Porsche, Saab, Suzuki, Rover Group, Toyota,
Volkswagen, and Volve.
Brand/Make.- There are 45 brands-Acura, Alfa, AMC, Audi, BMW, Buick,
Cadillac, Chevy, Chrysler, Daewoo, Dodge, Eagle, Ford, GMC, Honda, Hummer,
Hyundai, Infiniti, Isuzu, Jaguar, Jeep, Kia, Lexus, Lincoln, Mazda, Mercedes,
Mercury, Merkur, Mini, Mitsubishi, Nissan, Olds, Peugeot, Plymouth, Pontiac,
Porsche, Saab, Saturn, Scion, Subaru, Suzuki, Toyota, Volvo, and Volkswagen.
A.2 Fuel Efficiency Benefits of Technologies Adopted
Multipoint Fuel Inject (Port/MFI).- A fuel injector is placed at each of the
intake ports. This control increases the manufacturer’s ability to optimize the air-fuel
ratio for emissions, performance, and fuel consumption.28
Lockup.- Fuel consumption can be further reduced by locking up the torque
converter at lower vehicle speeds, provided there is sufficient power to propel the
28EPA (2001) Draft Regulatory Support Document: Control of Emission from Unregulated Nonroad
Engines. #EPA420-D-01-004. September 2001.
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vehicle, and noise and vibration are not excessive. It is applicable to all vehicle types
with automatic transmissions (EPA, 2008).
Multiple Valve.- A key aspect of engine design is the valvetrain. The number
of valves per cylinder can result in significant power and efficiency improvements
(EPA, 2014).
Adding Gears.- “Adding gears allows engine to operate at a more efficient speed
more often, and the more gearing options your vehicle has, the more efficient it can
be.”29
Variable Valve Timing.- A key aspect of engine design is the valvetrain. “The
ability to control valve timing allows the design of an engine combustion chamber
with a higher compression level than in engines equipped with fixed valve timing
engines, which in turn provide greater engine efficiency, more power and improved
combustion efficiency. VVT also allows the valves to be operated at different point
in the combustion cycle, ... i.e. resulting improved engine efficiency under low-load
conditions” (EPA, 2008).
29EPA’s Fuel Economy website: www.fueleconomy.gov
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Figure A.1: An Example of Technology Adoption, Multiple Valves
Note: This figure features an inline-four engine with four engine heads, each of which has four
valves per cylinder (link).
A.3 Definition of Knowledge Capital
Here I present a typical Patent EP 25695518 (link) with IPC code “FO1L”.
This patent is on “Methods and Systems for Internal Combustion Engine”.
Figure A.2: An Example of Knowledge Capital, A Typical Patent
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I select related International Patent Classification (IPC) codes following Aghion
et al. (2012), Haščič et al. (2008), Veefkind et al. (2012), Vollebergh (2010), and Green
Inventory developed by the World International Property Organization (WIPO).
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Table A.2: Definition of Knowledge Capital
Description IPC Code
Panel A. Engine and Powertrain Technologies
Cyclical operating valves for machines or engines F01L
Internal-combustion piston engines; combustion engines in general F02B
Controlling combustion engines F02D
Cylinders, pistons, or casings for combustion engines; arrangement of sealings in
combustion engines
F02F
Supplying combustion engines with combustible mixtures or constituents thereof F02M
Starting of combustion engines F02N
Ignitions (other than compressing ignition) for internal-combustion engines F02P
Electrical control and monitor of exhaust gasoline treating apparatus F01N 09
Panel B. Powertrain Technologies for Alternative Fuel Vehicles
A. Electric Vehicles
Electric propulsion with power supplied within the vehicle B60L
11/(02-16)
Electric device on electrically-propelled vehicles for safety purposes; Monitoring
operating variables, e.g. speed, deceleration, power consumption
B60L 03
Methods, circuits, or devices for controlling the traction-motor speed of
electrically-propelled vehicles
B60L 15
Arrangement or mounting of electrically propulsion units B60K 01
Conjoint control of vehicle sub-units of different types or different function /
including control of electric propulsion units, e.g. motors or generators / including





Arrangement or mounting of plural diverse prime-movers for mutual or common





Control system specially adapted for hybrid vehicles, i.e. vehicles having two or
more prime movers of more than one type, e.g. electrical and internal combustion
motors, all used for propulsion of vehicle
B60W 20
Regenerative breaking
Dynamic electric regenerative braking B60L 07/01
Braking by supplying regenerated power to the prime mover of vehicles comprising
engine-driven generators
B60L 07/20
C. Hydrogen Vehicles/Fuel Cells
Conjoint control of vehicle sub-units of different type or different function;
including control of fuel cells
B60W 10/28
Electric propulsion with power supplied with the vehicle-using power supplied
from primary cells, secondary cells, or fuel cells
B60L 11/18
Fuel cells; Manufacture thereof H01M 08
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B.1 Additional Appendix and Supplementary Document
See Online Appendix for:
• Appendix A.4 Adjustment of Patents
• Appendix B. Details in the Moment Equations
• Appendix C. Robustness and First Stage Results
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Chapter 2: The Effect of Market Size on Fuel-Saving Technology Adop-
tion in Passenger Vehicles
2.1 Introduction
Improving passenger vehicle fuel economy is a central part of international
efforts to reduce the risks of climate change. Passenger vehicles account for about 15
percent of US greenhouse gas emissions and half of transportation sector emissions
(IPCC, 2014). US regulations require new vehicle fuel economy to roughly double
between 2005 and 2025 to 54 miles per gallon (mpg); fuel economy or carbon dioxide
emissions standards are common across developed and developing countries.
Achieving the US fuel economy standards over the next decade requires sub-
stantial technology adoption (Knittel, 2012). Over the past several decades numerous
fuel-saving technologies, such as advanced transmissions, have been developed that
improve the efficiency of gasoline and diesel-powered vehicles. Knittel (2012) and
Klier & Linn (2012, 2016) find that the adoption of fuel-saving technologies over time
has improved the efficiency by 1 to 2 percent annually since 1980. Historically most
of that adoption has been used to improve attributes other than fuel economy, such
as horsepower and weight. Klier & Linn (2016) show that fuel economy standards
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have accelerated the market-wide rate of adoption of fuel-saving technologies, and
have caused manufacturers to use fuel-saving technology to raise fuel economy, rather
than other attributes such as horsepower.
This paper focuses on a manufacturer’s decision to adopt fuel-saving technology
for its individual vehicle models. Despite the importance of technology adoption in
meeting future standards, the economic factors that drive adoption remain unclear.
The literature has focused on the roles of costs and consumer willingness to pay
for technology in explaining technology adoption. Welfare analysis of fuel economy
standards, fuel taxes or a carbon tax (e.g., (Jacobsen, 2013; Klier & Linn, 2012)),
as well as the US regulatory agencies that have estimated the costs and benefits of
their fuel economy standards, assume that a manufacturer’s technology adoption for
each of its vehicles depends solely on technology costs and consumer willingness to
pay for the technology.
We depart from the traditional focus, and instead examine the role of market
size in explaining technology adoption. Because of fixed costs of technology adoption
or other reasons, market size may affect technology adoption according to theories of
endogenous technological change, such as directed technological change (Acemoglu,
2002). Carmakers typically redesign vehicles every five to seven years. Technology
adoption entails fixed costs, such as spending resources to redesign and test the
vehicle with a new technology before production begins. Fixed costs of adoption
cause the average cost of technology adoption to decline with a vehicle’s market
size. A manufacturer can recover fixed adoption costs by charging a markup over
marginal costs that depends on willingness to pay for fuel-saving technology and other
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factors (Berry, Levinsohn, & Pakes, 1995). Comparing two hypothetical vehicles for
which consumers have the same willingness to pay for fuel-saving technology, theory
predicts that the manufacturer will adopt more technology for the vehicle with the
larger market size.1
Whether market size affects passenger vehicle technology adoption is important
not only for understanding the historical determinants of technology adoption, but
also for consumer adoption of new technologies such as electric vehicles, and for the
welfare effects of fuel policy. Notwithstanding the media attention around electric
vehicles and other alternative technologies, the internal combustion engine continues
to dominate the market, accounting for about 97 percent of the US new vehicles
market in 2015. Given the market size advantage of gasoline-powered vehicles over
alternative fuel technologies such as plug-in electrics, a strong market size effect would
imply that manufacturers will continue directing efficiency improvements to gasoline-
powered vehicles (Acemoglu et al., 2012). These efficiency improvements will make
it more challenging for alternative fuel technologies to compete than in the absence
of a market size effect. In addition, the market size effect would have implications
for the welfare consequences of fuel policies such as fuel economy standards, fuel or
carbon taxes, and alternative fuel vehicle tax credits. The literature has provided
evidence of the role of market size in pharmaceutical innovation (Acemoglu & Linn,
2004), and a few studies (e.g., Newell, Jaffe, & Stavins (1999)) document the effects
of consumer demand on innovation and technology adoption in other industries.
1The US regulatory agencies include fixed costs in their cost benefit analysis of fuel economy
standards, but they do not consider the effect of market size on technology adoption.
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Although Acemoglu et al. (2016) demonstrate the importance of path dependence and
fuel prices on passenger vehicle engine patenting, there is no evidence for the effects
of market size or consumer demand on technology adoption among energy-intensive
durable goods such as passenger vehicles.2
We compare the effect of market size, as measured by vehicle sales, on fuel-
saving technology adoption with the effect of fuel-cost driven changes in consumer
demand. We focus on fuel-saving technology for the internal combustion engine,
including gasoline and diesel-powered engines, and associated transmissions. Using a
novel empirical strategy to account for the endogeneity of market size and unique data
on vehicle-level technology, consumer preferences, and demographics, we show that
market size has a statistically significant effect on fuel-saving technology adoption
for individual vehicles, and that this effect explains an economically important share
of historical technology adoption across vehicles in the market. Fuel costs affect
technology adoption but primarily via their effect on market size. Based on these
results we consider several counterfactual scenarios that illustrate the economic and
policy implications of the relationship between market size and technology adoption.
More specifically, we construct a unique data set that spans 1997-2013 and that
links US new vehicle sales and characteristics with consumer purchasing patterns by
demographics groups. We begin by defining a vehicle power train’s efficiency, which
is distinct from its fuel economy (hereafter we use efficiency, powertrain efficiency
and fuel efficiency interchangeably). For a given level of efficiency, a manufacturer
2The international trade literature focuses on the the link between market size and productivity
(Melitz & Ottaviano, 2008) or product choice (Mayer et al., 2014), but firm-specific productivity
and the technology of each product is exogenous in these models.
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can trade off fuel economy, horsepower, and weight, analogously to a production
possibilities frontier. When a manufacturer adds fuel-saving technology, it can
increase fuel economy without affecting the other characteristics. We define the
increase in efficiency that results from technology adoption as the increase in fuel
economy that is feasible while holding fixed other characteristics. This definition
accounts for the possibility that manufacturers adopt fuel-saving technologies and
use additional efficiency to boost horsepower or increase weight. We estimate the
efficiency of each vehicle model and year similarly to Klier & Linn (2016).
The main empirical challenge is the endogeneity of market size. The endo-
geneity problem, which is common to nearly all empirical analysis of market-driven
technological change, arises from both potential reverse causality and omitted variable
bias. Adopting fuel-saving technologies may increase demand for the vehicle, causing
sales to increase and creating reverse causality. Furthermore, omitted demand or
supply variables, such as a vehicle’s acceleration, can be correlated with both market
size and efficiency.
To address this challenge we construct an instrumental variable (IV) that takes
advantage of variation in consumer demographics over time, combined with variation
in purchasing behavior across consumer groups. For example, larger households tend
to purchase more minivans than smaller households. The fact that the share of large
households in the United States has decreased over the sample reduces demand for
minivans relative to other market segments. The validity of the instrument rests on
the exogeneity of time series changes in demographics to the vehicle market. Acemoglu
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& Linn (2004) and DellaVigna & Pollet (2007) have similarly used demographic
trends as exogenous determinants of market size in other industries.3
We find that a one standard deviation increase in market size, which corresponds
to about a 10 percent increase, raises a vehicle’s efficiency by 0.3 percentage points.
This estimate constitutes a large increase relative to the average annual efficiency
increase of about 1.4 percentage points between 1997 and 2013. We test whether
a vehicle’s efficiency responds to the efficiency of competing vehicles or to the
manufacturer’s stock of fuel-saving patents, finding some effect of competing vehicles.
However, these effects are less precisely estimated than the primary effect of market
size on efficiency. We also find that the main results are robust to alternative
functional forms or constructions of the instruments.
We compare the effect of instrumented market size with the effect of fuel-cost
driven changes in willingness to pay for fuel economy. Busse et al. (2013) and Allcott
& Wozny (2014) demonstrate that high gasoline prices raise the market shares of
vehicles with high fuel economy relative to vehicles with low fuel economy, and that
consumers value the fuel savings offered by vehicles with high fuel economy. These
findings suggest that an increase in fuel costs can affect technology adoption in two
ways: first, by affecting market size, and second, by affecting consumers’ willingness
to pay for fuel-saving technology that raises fuel economy. In contrast to the strong
effect of market size on technology adoption, after controlling for market size, fuel
costs do not have a statistically significant effect on technology adoption. However,
fuel costs strongly predict market size, which is consistent with the literature. The
3Other papers have use pre-sample information to address endogeneity (Blundell et al., 1999).
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results suggest that fuel costs affect technology adoption via market size, but not
via willingness to pay for fuel cost savings. This finding is consistent with Busse et
al. (2013), who show that gasoline prices have large effects on market shares but
relatively small effects on vehicle prices.
The empirical findings are the basis for four sets of simulations that demonstrate
the economic and policy implications of the results. First, historical fuel price-driven
changes in market size have had large effects on technology adoption. We illustrate
this point by simulating the effects of fuel prices on the cross-sectional distribution
of efficiency. The 80 percent increase in real gasoline prices between 2003 and 2007
raised the market size of vehicles with high fuel economy relative to vehicles with
low fuel economy. In turn, the changes in market size caused efficiency of the lowest
fuel economy vehicles to be lower than if fuel prices had remained at the low 2003
levels. Likewise, efficiency of the highest fuel economy vehicles was higher in 2007
than if fuel prices had remained at 2003 levels.
Second, demographics have had a large effect on the fuel efficiency distribution
across models in different market segments. The overall shifts in demographics
between 1980 and 2013 caused a shift in efficiency improvements away from light
trucks and toward cars.
Third, changes in market size for crossovers and sport utility vehicles (SUVs)
affected technology adoption. Between 2000 and 2004, the per-model sales of
crossovers increased by 44 percent and per-model sales of SUVs decreased by 25
percent. The increase in crossover market size raised crossover efficiency and the
decrease in SUV market size reduced SUV efficiency.
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The fourth simulation concerns policies that aim to improve new vehicle fuel
economy. Although a carbon price, fuel tax increase, feebate and fuel economy
standard affect the vehicle market in different ways, these policies have the common
feature that they increase the relative market size of vehicles with high fuel economy.
For a carbon or gasoline tax increase, the market shares change because higher
tax-inclusive fuel costs cause consumers to choose vehicles with higher average fuel
economy (Klier & Linn, 2010; Li, Linn, & Muehlegger, 2014). In the case of fuel
economy standards or a feebate (which jointly taxes and subsidizes vehicles according
to their fuel economy), manufacturers respond to standards partly by reducing the
relative price of vehicles with high fuel economy, raising their market share (Goldberg,
1995).
These policy-induced changes in market size in turn affect the cross-sectional
efficiency distribution. In our data, efficiency is positively correlated with fuel
economy. These policies would strengthen this positive correlation by shifting sales
to vehicles with high fuel economy and causing greater efficiency improvements
for those vehicles than for vehicles with lower fuel economy. Because alternative
fuel vehicles likely compete with high fuel economy gasoline-powered vehicles, the
resulting increase in efficiency for vehicles with high fuel economy will present an
even greater challenge for alternative technologies such as electric vehicles to gain
market share. The market size effect also introduces an unintended effect of feebates
or fuel taxes, which is to decrease the efficiency of vehicle with low fuel economy.
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2.2 Data and Summary Statistics
2.2.1 Data
We assemble three data sets for the empirical analysis. The first data set
includes vehicle characteristics and sales by model year and model version. This
data set is constructed by merging vehicle characteristics by model year and model
version with sales by model year, model, and power type. The characteristics are
from Ward’s Automotive Annual Yearbooks from 1997 through 2013.4 A model year
begins in September of the previous calendar year and ends in the current calendar
year. A model version refers to a unique model, trim, body type, and fuel type, such
as the 2-door gasoline-powered Honda Accord coupe. In addition to these identifying
characteristics, other vehicle characteristics include fuel economy, horsepower, torque,
weight, transmission type, engine displacement, number of cylinders, and market
segment.5 Our data exclude hybrid and electric vehicles, which accounts for 0.8
percent of sales between 1997 and 2013.6
4A change in reporting in 1997 prevents us extending the sample to earlier years.
5Market segment is aggregated from the Ward’s vehicle classes as in Klier & Linn (2016).
6The recent Volkswagen scandal raises some concerns about the accuracy of laboratory testing of
vehicle emissions. Laboratory testing of US vehicle fuel economy typically overstates fuel economy
by about 20 percent relative to the fuel economy values that appear on window stickers at new
car dealerships. There are a few instances of US laboratory tests overstating fuel economy by a
substantially greater amount, but these events have affected a smaller number of vehicles than the
Volkswagen event. Testing inaccuracies are likely a more important issue for emissions of other
pollutants–such as nitrogen oxides–than for fuel economy or greenhouse gases. The reason is that
consumers can observe a vehicle’s fuel economy (which is directly related to its rate of greenhouse
gas emissions) but they cannot directly observe emissions of other pollutants. This makes it easier
to detect systematic cheating on fuel economy than on emissions of other pollutants, providing a
disincentive for manufacturers to cheat on fuel economy ratings.
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The sales data are from Ward’s Automotive InfoBank, which reports sales by
month, model, and fuel type (gasoline, diesel fuel, and flex fuel, which are capable
of using gasoline that contains a high percentage of ethanol). Because technology
adoption depends on different factors for conventional internal combustion engines
and hybrid electric vehicles, our analysis includes only gasoline and diesel fuel vehicles,
as well flex-fuel vehicles; these vehicles account for about 97 percent of the US market
in 2013 and 99 percent between 1997 and 2013. We aggregate sales by model year,
model, and fuel type and merge with the characteristics data. We collect the real
average state-level gasoline and diesel fuel prices by model year from the U.S. Energy
Information Administration, and merge the fuel prices to the sales and characteristics
data.
The second data set contains vehicle purchases by demographic group and
year. We use the 1995 National Personal Travel Survey (NPTS) and the 2001 and
2009 National Household Travel Survey (NHTS). The Department of Transportation
makes the survey data available to the public and the three waves had similar scope
and sampling methodologies. The samples are considerably larger in the latter years.
We refer to all surveys as the NHTS for convenience. For each household in the
multi-year sample, the survey collects information on demographics (age, income,
etc.), vehicle holdings, and vehicle use. We keep vehicles that were purchased new in
the survey year.
A demographic group is defined by a unique combination of age group, house-
hold income group, household size, education group, urbanization status, and ge-
ographic Census division (see Appendix Table A.1 for definitions of the groups).
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The age and education groups are based on the attributes of the respondent. Other
groups are based on the attributes of the household. Using sample weights for each
of the three survey waves we compute the average number of new vehicles purchased
per household by market segment and demographic group. For example, we compute
the average number of new SUVs purchased by the group defined by households
headed by a 26-30 year old with 12 or more years of schooling, with annual household
income of $10-20,000, containing two people, and located in an urban area in New
England.
The third data set is constructed from the Current Population Survey (CPS),
which is available at the National Bureau of Economic Research, from 1980 through
2013. We compute the number of households for each demographic group using the
sample weights. We use the same six-dimension demographic groups as we use in
the NHTS.
2.2.2 Summary Statistics
In this subsection we present summary statistics of vehicle market trends,
consumer purchasing patterns, the evolution of consumer demographics over time,
and manufacturer adoption of fuel-saving technologies. Figure 2.1 shows total sales
by market segment for model years 1997 through 2013, separately for cars and light
trucks. The figure illustrates considerable variation in segment-level sales, such as
the growth for crossovers that began in the late 1990s and the decline in sport utility
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vehicles (SUVs) that began shortly thereafter. This variation is useful in identifying
the effect of market size on power train efficiency.
Table 2.1 shows average vehicle characteristics at various times in the sample.
Average fuel economy was fairly flat through the mid-2000s, and increased at the
end of the sample. Horsepower and weight increased steadily through the sample.
Vehicle torque, which represents light truck towing ability, followed a similar pattern.
Figure 2.2 summarizes the variation in vehicle purchasing patterns across
demographic groups. The figure indicates a substantial amount of variation in
purchase behavior across groups. The variation is largely intuitive. For example,
Panel A shows that younger households are more likely to buy small cars than older
households, and wealthier households are more likely to buy crossovers and SUVs
than small cars. Geographic variables are also correlated with purchase behavior;
households in urban areas and the Northeast are much less likely to buy pickup
trucks than are other households. The demographic variables are correlated with
one another; for example, households with high incomes tend to be well educated.
As the next section explains, the IV accounts for this correlation.
Figure 2.3 shows changes in demographics over time from the CPS. Average
age, education, and urbanization increased over time, whereas average household
size decreased. As the next section explains, we combine this variation with the
variation in purchasing patterns across demographics groups illustrated in Figure
2.2 to construct the instrumental variable for market size. The raw data support
this approach by indicating that the time series changes in demographics, combined
with heterogeneous purchasing patterns across demographic groups, are consistent
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with changes in market size. For example, the market share of crossovers increased
from the late 1990s through the 2000s. This is consistent with the fact that older
households are more likely to purchase crossovers than younger households, and that
during the same time period the share of older households increased. Likewise, the
market size of medium-size cars decreased in the 2000s. This is consistent with the
fact that urban consumers tend to purchase more medium cars than other consumers,
and that the urbanization rate decreased in the 2000s.
Finally, we present some background information about technology adoption
in the US new vehicles market. Manufacturers continually redesign their vehicles,
improving power train technologies and other attributes that consumer demand.
Many vehicles experience major redesigns at regular intervals, commonly every five
to seven years. During a redesign, the manufacturer may make major changes to the
power train, cabin, cargo, or exterior. In between redesigns, manufacturers commonly
make smaller changes to exterior design, such as offering new options (e.g., paint
color) or making small changes to the power train, such as increasing the number of
transmission speeds.
These regularities yield a process of steady technology adoption over time.
Figure 2.4 shows the share of vehicles in the market with the indicated fuel-saving
engine or transmission technologies. The data cover 1986 through 2014, and are
from the EPA Annual Fuel Economy Guides and Trend Reports. For many of these
technologies, the figure suggests fairly typical patterns in the technology adoption
literature, in which the penetration rate is very low initially, subsequently increases
steeply, and then levels off–that is, an S-curve. Note that the penetration rate of mul-
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tiport fuel injection decreases in the late 2000s, which is because many manufacturers
have begun to replace this technology with other fuel injection technologies.
2.3 Empirical Strategy
In this section we motivate the reduced-form estimation equation using a simple
model of technology adoption with fixed costs. Then, we estimate efficiency of each
vehicle in the sample, and finally we derive the estimating equation and explain the
IV strategy.
2.3.1 Technology Adoption with Fixed Costs
In this subsection we outline a simple model of technology adoption with fixed
costs. In practice, manufacturers can improve efficiency by adding technologies such
as those depicted in Figure 2.4. Adoption entails fixed costs because of the need to
redesign and test the vehicle before commencing production of vehicles that include
the new technology. Many efficiency-improving technologies also increase marginal
costs because adoption requires that new parts be installed in the power train. For
example, NAS (2015) estimates that adding cylinder deactivation, which effectively
shuts off a subset of a vehicle’s cylinders when the vehicle is operating under a
light load, increases production costs by $118-133 per vehicle. To approximate these
aspects of technology adoption, we assume that both marginal costs, c, and fixed
costs, F , have positive first and second derivatives with respect to efficiency, τ .
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The analysis focuses on a firm that sells one type of vehicle. The firm chooses
the vehicle’s price p and efficiency to maximize profits:
π(p, τ) = max
p,τ
(p− c(τ)) q(τ, p)− F (τ)
where q is the quantity of vehicles demanded, which equals quantity supplied
in equilibrium. We assume quantity demanded decreases with price and increases
with efficiency (that is, ∂q
∂p
< 0 and ∂q
∂τ
> 0).
This setup introduces the simplification that vehicle demand depends on the
vehicle’s efficiency. Most consumers likely care about fuel economy, horsepower,
and other vehicle characteristics that affect efficiency, rather than efficiency per
se. As we discuss in Section 2.3.2, for a vehicle with a particular level of efficiency
there exist trade-offs between fuel economy, horsepower, and weight. Consequently,
manufacturers will choose efficiency and then select fuel economy, horsepower, and
characteristics that affect weight (such as electronic accessories). For simplicity we
abstract from those subsequent decisions and instead focus on the choice of fuel
efficiency. We assume that quantity demanded increases with efficiency because
a vehicle with higher efficiency allows the manufacturer to increase fuel economy
without sacrificing other characteristics (or likewise, increase horsepower or weight,
without sacrificing other characteristics). Jointly modeling the manufacturer’s choice
of efficiency, horsepower, and fuel economy, as in Klier & Linn (2012), would not
affect the main conclusions but would increase the complexity of the expressions
below.
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The first order conditions for price and efficiency are
price: (p− c)∂q
∂p
+ q = 0
efficiency: (p− c)∂q
∂τ
− c′q − F ′ = 0
where c′and F ′ indicate the first derivatives with respect to efficiency. Combin-
ing the two first order conditions and rearranging them yields
F ′(τ) = q(−c′ − η) (2.1)
where η = ∂q/∂τ∂q/∂p < 0, and η increases the more sensitive is quantity demanded
to efficiency than to price. Provided that η does not decrease quickly with quantity
(i.e., ∂η/∂q > −1), and c′ is relatively small in magnitude, equation (2.1) shows that
equilibrium efficiency increases with vehicle sales. That is, vehicles with higher
equilibrium market size have higher efficiency. In addition, η captures the willingness
to pay for efficiency, and equation (2.1) shows that higher willingness to pay raises
efficiency. Although we do not show it here, this conclusion is unaffected if the firm
sells multiple vehicles (provided that fixed costs are vehicle-specific) or faces a fuel
economy standard. The positive relationship between sales and efficiency is more
general than the simple model implies.
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2.3.2 Estimating Power Train Efficiency
The empirical objective is to estimate the effect of market size on power train
efficiency. In this subsection we describe the construction of the dependent variable,
which is power train efficiency.
We do not directly observe a vehicle’s efficiency. The data do not contain
efficiency per se, but they do include fuel economy and a number of other observable
variables that affect efficiency, such as the number of engine cylinders.
We follow Knittel (2012) and Klier & Linn (2016) and estimate efficiency from
the available data. We begin by defining a power train’s efficiency as the amount
of useful energy it produces per unit of fuel consumption. Fuel economy (miles per
gallon) is distinct from fuel efficiency. A vehicle’s fuel economy depends on the
efficiency of its power train as well as characteristics such as horsepower, weight, and
body type (which affects air resistance). As in Klier & Linn (2016), we conceive of
an efficiency frontier defined in fuel economy-horsepower-weight space. The frontier
represents the maximum fuel economy that can be achieved given any particular
level of horsepower and weight, and holding efficiency fixed along the frontier. That
is, for a particular level of efficiency, as it moves along the frontier, the manufacturer
can trade off fuel economy for weight and horsepower.
This framework yields a straightforward identification of efficiency improve-
ments over time. Specifically, we estimate the shape of the frontier using within-model
variation in horsepower, weight, and fuel economy. In the baseline we assume that
the shape of the frontier does not change over time. In that case, if we control for the
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effects of weight, horsepower, and other attributes on fuel economy, an increase in
fuel economy is equivalent to an increase in efficiency. To implement this approach,
we estimate an equation similar to Klier & Linn (2016)
ln ejt = λh lnhjt + λw lnwjt + τmt +Xjtδ + εjt, (2.2)
where ejt is the fuel economy of vehicle j in model year t, hjt is horsepower
for passenger cars (and torque for light-duty trucks), wjt is weight, τmt is a set of
interactions of model by model year, Xjt includes a vector of vehicle attributes, εjt
is an error term, and the λ’s and δ are coefficients to be estimated. The coefficients
on weight and horsepower capture trade-offs between these characteristics and fuel
economy. We expect both coefficients to be negative. The controls in Xjt include
fixed effects for whether the vehicle uses diesel fuel, whether the vehicle is flex-fuel
capable, whether the vehicle has a manual transmission, as well as fixed effects for
the number of doors and the number of cylinders. Together, these variables allow
for the fact that versions of a particular model sold in the same model year have
different efficiency depending on fuel type and body type (as approximated by the
number of doors). We estimate the equation separately for cars and light trucks to
allow the coefficients to vary across the two classes.
We interpret the interactions of model by model year, τmt, as the average
efficiency of vehicles belonging to the model, and sold in model year t. The difference
between τmt and τm(t−1) is the change in efficiency of model m between model years
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t− 1 and t. Equation (2.2) thus allows us to identify changes in efficiency over time,
where efficiency is measured in units of fuel economy.
Before presenting the results from estimating equation (2.2) we briefly discuss
identification and potential sources of bias. The equation characterizes a technical
relationship between vehicle characteristics and fuel economy. The equation does not
include certain vehicle attributes that consumers care about, such as seating comfort.
Such attributes could be correlated with variables that are included in equation
(2.2), but in this context that would not bias the coefficients as long as the omitted
variables affect fuel economy via horsepower or weight, and not independently of
the included variables. In other words, identification rests on the ability to include
the variables that directly determine a vehicle’s fuel economy. The high R-squared
value reported below supports this estimation approach. See Klier & Linn (2016) for
additional discussion of identification of equation (2.2).
Table 2.2 reports the main coefficient estimates from equation (2.2). Because
fuel economy, horsepower, and weight enter equation (2.2) in logs, the horsepower
and weight coefficients are elasticities. The coefficients on diesel fuel and flex fuel
are the difference between log fuel economy of a vehicle that uses diesel fuel or is flex
fuel-capable, and the log fuel economy of an otherwise comparable gasoline-powered
vehicle. Diesel fuel vehicles achieve about 30 percent higher fuel economy, and
flex-fuel light trucks achieve about 27 percent worse fuel economy than gasoline-
powered vehicles. The negative coefficient on flex-fuel vehicles reflects the lower
energy content of ethanol compared to gasoline. Overall, the estimates in Table 2.2
have the expected signs and are statistically significant at the one percent level. The
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magnitudes are similar to those reported in Klier & Linn (2016) for both cars and
light trucks.
Because of the large number of estimated model by model year interactions, we
aggregate across observations before reporting those estimates. Figure 2.5 plots the
change in power train efficiency, averaged across cars and light trucks. The figure
shows steady efficiency improvements for both vehicle classes. Table 2.3 shows the
average change in efficiency by 5-year time period, separating models with sales
above the median level of sales for the corresponding period and vehicles with sales
below the median level of sales. Efficiency improvements are generally higher for the
higher-selling models, which previews the main empirical finding that market size
has a positive effect on efficiency-improving technology adoption.
2.3.3 Empirical Strategy for Estimating the Effect of Market Size on
Efficiency
This section presents the strategy for estimating the effect of market size on
efficiency. We assume a log-linear relationship between market size and efficiency
that can be derived from equation (2.1) if we assume that fixed costs of technology
adoption are iso-elastic (i.e., F (τ) ∝ τα, where α > 1). Alternatively, a log-linear
functional form can be derived from a model in which marginal costs decrease with
production, because of learning by doing or scale economies in vehicle production.
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The estimating equation is
τ̂mt = γ1 lnQmt + γ2C̄mt,s + φt + φb + φb × t+ εmt (2.3)
where τ̂mt is powertrain efficiency estimated from equation (2.2), Qmt is sales, C̄mt,s
is fuel costs per mile (dollars-per-mile)7, φt and φb are sets of year and brand fixed
effects, φb × t is the interaction of brand fixed effects with a linear time trend,
and εmt is an error term. The two parameters of interest are γ1 and γ2, which
are the effects of log sales and fuel costs on efficiency. Equation (2.1) implies a
positive coefficient on log sales, which would indicate that manufacturers adopt
more efficiency for high-selling vehicles. The coefficient on fuel costs is the effect of
fuel costs on efficiency, holding market size fixed. We discuss the identification and
interpretation of this coefficient at the end of the subsection. The year fixed effects
control for aggregate demand or supply shocks and the brand fixed effects control
for brand-level supply or demand shocks, such as consumer perceptions of brand
quality. The interactions of the brand fixed effects with a linear time trend allows
brand-specific demand and supply shocks to vary linearly over time. For example,
the time trends control for changes in consumer preferences for brands as well as
changes in brand quality.
Estimating equation (2.3) by ordinary least squares (OLS) is likely to yield
biased estimates for three main reasons. First, there would be reverse causality
if increasing a vehicle’s efficiency raises a vehicle’s demand and equilibrium sales.
7We explain at the end of this section that fuel cost C̄mt,s depends on gas prices at each
geographic division collected from each survey round year s.
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Second, sales may be correlated with unobserved supply or demand determinants
of fuel-saving technologies. The brand fixed effects and time trends control for
brand-level supply or demand shocks, but efficiency could be correlated with within-
brand variation in vehicle characteristics. For example, there is anecdotal evidence
that manufacturers test efficiency-improving technologies on luxury or performance
vehicles before installing the technologies more broadly. This practice would cause
sales and efficiency to be correlated with (omitted) characteristics such as seating
quality or cabin space. Note that we could control flexibly for omitted model-level
characteristics by including model fixed effects in equation (2.3). That approach
would yield an undesirable interpretation of γ, however. The coefficient would be
identified by within-model variation over time in sales and efficiency. In practice,
manufacturers face choices not only about when to adopt technologies for a particular
model but also, given time and resource costs, for which of its models to improve
technologies at a particular time. Including model fixed effects would identify the
former choice but not the latter, and therefore might omit an important role of
market size in technology adoption across vehicle models.
A final source of bias is that technology adoption is a dynamic decision that
includes fixed and irreversible costs. Efficiency may therefore depend on current sales
as well as expected future sales. We use current sales in equation (2.3) as a proxy
for expected sales, but this introduces measurement error that biases the estimated
sales coefficient.
We instrument for sales and address all three sources of bias. The IV is
the vehicle’s potential market size, which depends on cross-sectional variation in
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consumer purchasing patterns and time series variation in demographics. We define
demographic group cell, g, by age, income, education, household size, urbanization,
and Census division. In total, we have 2,700 group cells, each represents 300
households over 1997-2013 in average. (see Appendix Table A.1 for definitions of
the groups).8 To measure purchasing behavior by group, we compute qmgs as the
number of vehicles of model m purchased per household by demographic group cell
g in NHTS survey year s (recall that we use data from the NHTS survey years 1995,
2001, and 2009).9 To measure time-series variation in demographics, we compute the
number of households in demographic group cell g in year t,wgt , using CPS data.
The potential market size is the product of NHTS vehicle purchases per household





The subscript s in potential market size reflects the fact that qmgs varies across
NHTS survey waves. The IV is based on the assumption that wgt is exogenous to the
demand and supply of new vehicle technologies. Changes in educational attainment,
labor participation and the US income distribution are driven by broad technological
developments (such as information technology), the decrease in unionization, and
other factors that are largely unrelated to the new vehicle market (Black & Lynch,
8We aggregate 817,000 household between 1997 and 2013 to 2,700 cells. Alternatively, we have
specified demographic cells with higher level of aggregation and lower level of aggregation. Point
estimate and standard errors are barely affected.
9Alternatively, we hold vehicle purchase pattern unchanged NHTS 2009 survey round only as a
robust check.
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2001; Bresnahan et al., 2002; Jorgenson, 2001; Johnson & Mieszkowski, 1970; Autor
et al., 2008). Likewise, the overall increase in age depicted in Figure 2.3 arises
from the aging of the baby boom generation. Household size, urbanization, and
migration trends are similarly driven by changing preferences and other factors that
are unrelated to demand and supply of new vehicle technologies. The assumed
exogeneity of these demographics follows assumptions made by Acemoglu & Linn
(2004) and DellaVigna & Pollet (2007) for consumer demand in other industries.
The IV also addresses potential classical measurement error; we discuss non-classical
measurement error in the next section.
We would be concerned about using the average per-household vehicle purchases,
qmgs, however, because this variable is likely to be correlated with demand and supply
factors omitted from equation (2.3). For example, an increase in the efficiency of
crossovers would increase per-household purchases of crossovers as measured in the
NHTS, creating reverse causality between the dependent variable and the NHTS
weights.
We make two refinements to the instrument to address this issue. First, we
define time periods based on the NHTS survey waves: 1997-2000, 2001-2008, and
2009-2013. The variable qmgs is measured at the beginning of each time period
and does not vary across years within a period. Returning to the example of an
efficiency improvement of crossovers, the fact that qmgs is constant within a time
period reduces the likelihood that efficiency improvements that occur within the
period are correlated with qmgs because the variable is measured at the beginning of
the period and does not change in response to efficiency improvements.
102
However, there could be unobserved and time-invariant characteristics of the
vehicle that are correlated with efficiency and qmgs. We use a second refinement
to address this possibility, and demean Q̃mt;s by period and vehicle model. The
demeaned value Q̄mt;s, is the instrument. This refinement eliminates correlation
between the IV and unobserved model characteristics that are time invariant. Note
that rather than demeaning the instrument we could add model by period interactions
to equation (2.3), but this would affect the interpretation of the log market size
coefficient as discussed above.
The demeaned potential market size, Q̄mt;s, is the IV in the first stage for
market size in equation (2.3), which also contains fuel costs
lnQmt = β1 ln Q̄mt;s + β2C̄mt,s + β3I
imp
mt + φt + φb + φb × t+ umt (2.4)
where I impmt is an indicator variable equal to one if the instrument is imputed using
brand-segment-year means.10 As we show below, the instrument is a strong predictor
of log sales, reducing concerns about weak instruments bias. Because the instrument
is demeaned by time period, the identifying assumption is that within-period variation
in demographics is uncorrelated with omitted demand and supply shocks. Supporting
this assumption is the fact that demographic shifts are slow-moving and are driven
by factors such as the aging of the baby-boom generation and macroeconomic factors.
10Some vehicle models appear in the sales and characteristics data but not in the NHTS data.
Most of these are low-selling models. In these cases, we impute the instruments using brand-level
average NHTS weights.
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Under this identifying assumption the IV strategy addresses reverse causality and
omitted variables bias. The instrument is plausibly uncorrelated with measurement
error in actual market size, addressing bias due to classical measurement error (we
discuss non-classical measurement error in Section 2.4.2).
We interpret the coefficient on log sales in equation (2.3) as the effect on
efficiency of a change in market size induced by a change in potential market size.
In practice, changes in potential market size may affect equilibrium sales as well
as vehicle prices. We do not control for vehicle prices in equation (2.3) because
prices are likely to be correlated with unobserved demand or supply factors, and
we lack suitable price instruments in this context in which technology and vehicle
characteristics are endogenous (Klier & Linn, 2012). If the potential market size
is a valid instrument, it is uncorrelated with unobserved supply or demand factors
that affect vehicle price (and sales), and omitting the vehicle’s price would not cause
spurious results.
Next, we discuss the identification and interpretation of the vehicle’s fuel cost
per mile. The coefficient on fuel cost per mile is identified by fuel price and fuel
economy variation across vehicles and over time. As in recent research we use
the contemporaneous fuel price under the assumption that price shocks are fully
persistent. Previous research (Klier & Linn, 2010) has used the ratio of the national
average fuel price to the vehicle’s fuel economy to approximate per-mile fuel costs.
Using this approach, fuel cost per mile varies because of time-series variation in fuel
prices and cross-model variation in fuel economy. We slightly refine our previous
approach and introduce additional variation by exploiting geographic variation in
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fuel prices and vehicle purchases. For example, fuel prices tend to be higher in
the Northeast than the Midwest. Households purchase more small cars relative to
pickup trucks in the Northeast than the Midwest, which causes the national average
fuel price for households that purchase small cars to be higher than the national
average fuel price for households that purchase pickup trucks. Formally, we compute
a model-specific fuel price using NHTS data on vehicle purchases and EIA data on




(pdt × qmgs × wgt) /Q̃mt
We calculate the fuel cost per mile as the ratio of the model’s fuel price to its fuel




In the cross section, C̃mt;s is correlated with the vehicle’s fuel economy (by construc-
tion), and may therefore be correlated with vehicle characteristics that are correlated
with fuel economy, such as horsepower. Including C̃mt;s in equation (2.3) as an
independent variable would yield biased estimates because the variable would be
correlated with the error term in equation (2.3). Similarly to the potential market
size instrument, we eliminate this possibility by subtracting the mean fuel cost by
model and period to obtain the demeaned independent variable C̄mt;s, which we
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include in equation (2.3). Note that demeaning this variable reduces concerns about
the potential endogeneity of the NHTS weights in the fuel price.
The coefficient on log fuel costs is the effect of fuel costs on efficiency after
controlling for market size. Because the estimating equation includes year fixed
effects, the coefficient is identified by within-year variation in fuel costs. We expect
the coefficient to be positive because higher fuel costs raise the value of an efficiency
improvement of a particular magnitude.
We interpret this coefficient as capturing the effect of consumer willingness to
pay for fuel-saving technology. The coefficient on log sales is identified by variation
in the IV as well as all of the other independent variables, which includes fuel costs.




Table 2.4 shows the main estimation results. Column 1 reports the OLS
estimates of equation (2.3) for comparison with the IV estimates in column 2. In all
columns of Table 2.4, the dependent variable is the efficiency estimated in Table 2.2
and observations are by model and model year from 1997 through 2013. To control
for aggregate demand or supply shocks as well as brand-specific shocks, the regression
includes year fixed effects, brand fixed effects, and the interaction of a linear time
trend with brand fixed effects. The table reports the estimated coefficient on log
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sales with the bootstrapped standard error in parentheses, clustered by brand (make)
to allow for arbitrary correlation of the error terms within manufacturers and over
time. The estimated coefficient on log sales is 0.006 and the estimate is statistically
significant at the five percent level. The coefficient on fuel costs is negative, and the
estimate is statistically significant at the one percent level.
The OLS estimates in column 1 are likely to be biased because of reverse
causality, omitted variable bias, and measurement error (see Section 2.3.3). To
address all three issues, we instrument for log sales using the log of demographics-
driven potential market size, ln Q̄mt;s. Column 2 in Panel B of Table 2.4 shows the
results from the first stage. The instrument is a strong predictor of market size.
The coefficient has the expected positive sign, and is statistically significant at the 1
percent level.
The magnitude of the IV estimate in Panel A is statistically and economically
significant. Between 1997 and 2013, the average annual efficiency improvement
is about 1.4 percent (see Figure 2.5). As shown in column 2, the estimated sales
coefficient implies that a one standard deviation increase in log sales, or a 10 percent
increase, raises efficiency by 0.3 percent. This estimate is substantially larger than
the OLS estimate in column 1. It suggests that omitted variables or measurement
error biases the OLS estimate towards zero. The fact that the OLS estimates is
biased towards zero also suggests that main endogeneity issue is omitted variable
bias rather than reverse causality. In the following subsections we present a variety
of additional estimation results and we refer to column 2 in Table 2.4 as our baseline
estimate.
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The coefficient on fuel costs in the second stage is negative, but the estimate is
much smaller than in column 1 and it is not statistically significant. In addition to the
lack of statistical significance, the results in Section 2.5.1 show that the magnitude
is small. Comparing this estimate with the OLS estimate suggests that fuel costs
affect fuel-saving technology adoption primarily via market size. The negative and
statistically significant negative coefficient on fuel costs in column 1 likely reflects
the correlation between sales and fuel costs. The negative OLS coefficient may also
reflect a negative correlation between fuel economy and other vehicle attributes such
as horsepower. After controlling for fuel-cost driven changes in market size in the
first stage, fuel costs do not affect efficiency. Nevertheless, fuel costs affect market
size, as the first-stage coefficient on fuel costs indicates. The importance of market
size in determining the adoption of fuel-saving technology, relative to the direct effect
of fuel costs, is confirmed in column 3, in which we omit fuel costs from the first and
second stages. In this case, the coefficient on log sales is nearly identical to that in
column 2.
2.4.2 Alternative Estimation Models
As discussed above, the IV addresses the main potential sources of bias. In
this subsection we show that the results are robust to adding further controls and
alternative procedures for estimating efficiency and market size.
The baseline includes controls for brand-level demand or supply shocks, but
there may also be segment-level shocks. For example, the increase in market shares
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of crossovers in the late 1990s and early 2000s, along with the decrease in market
share of SUVs during the same period, could reflect a shift in consumer preferences
toward smaller light trucks. Although we subtract mean preferences by model and
period from the instruments, causing them to be orthogonal to segment-level shocks,
there could be within-period preference changes correlated with the within-period
demographic changes. Such a correlation would bias the IV estimate, but column
3 shows that the log sales coefficient is very similar if we add to the baseline the
interactions of market segment fixed effects and a linear time trend.
Fuel economy standards have varied over the data sample in stringency and
form. The standards were roughly constant in the 1990s and early 2000s, began
increasing for light trucks in 2005, and then for both cars and light trucks in 2011.
Because of differences in fleet composition and market positioning, the standards
impose varying degrees of pressure across manufacturers to improve fuel economy
over time, which has affected the adoption of energy efficiency-improving technologies
(Klier & Linn, 2016). The interactions of brand fixed effects with a linear time
trend control for this varying pressure to some extent, because the standards require
manufacturers to achieve fleet-wide levels of fuel economy. We have tried several
semi-parametric approaches to controlling for fuel economy standards, in addition to
using brand fixed effect and the interactions of brand fixed effects with a linear time
trend. In particular, column 4 includes the interactions of brand fixed effects with a
quadratic time trend. This controls for the nonlinear changes in the stringency of
the standards over time across manufacturers. Historically the standards applied
separately for cars and light trucks, but since 2011 manufacturers can average across
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their entire fleet (Leard & McConnell, 2016). To account for the differing regulatory
pressure across cars and light trucks, column 5 includes triple interactions of brand
fixed effects, vehicle class fixed effects (i.e., passenger car or light-duty truck), and
a linear time trend. This controls for changes in stringency of standard over time
across vehicle class. The results are similar to our baseline in column 2. Note that
these specifications also address the potential bias caused by unobserved demand
or supply shocks at the brand, market segment, or class level. The results are also
similar to the baseline if we control directly for the stringency of the standards
as in Klier & Linn (2016). In Table 2.4 column 7, e the coefficient on log sales is
0.30, with standard error 0.15, which is statistically significant at the 5 percent level
and very similar to the baseline estimate. It is possible that there are remaining
unobservable taste and cost components correlated with shadow costs complying to
CAFE standard that varies at vehicle model level. To account for that, we interact
CAFE stringency variable with fuel cost savings. As shown in column 8, the results
is similar to our baseline.
Table 2.5 reports estimates of equation (2.3) using alternative measures of
efficiency as the dependent variable. In the baseline specification (repeated in
column 1 for convenience), we estimate efficiency by model and model year τmt
using equation (2.2), implicitly assuming that efficiency is constant across versions
of the same model and model year. This assumption is supported by the fact that
versions of the same model, such as the Honda Accord, typically include the engines
produced on the same or very similar production platform. However, because many
technologies are installed at the engine platform rather than the model level and some
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models share an engine platform (Klier & Linn, 2012), platform-level market size
could affect efficiency. To assess whether engine platform-level market size affects
efficiency, columns 2 and 3 report estimates of equation (2.3) that are the same as the
baseline, except for the estimation of the dependent variable. These specifications
take advantage of highly detailed engine platform data, which allow us to identify
the specific engine sold with each version. In column 2 we estimate efficiency in
equation (2.2) by engine platform and model year rather than by model and model
year, and use the estimated efficiency as the dependent variable in equation (2.3).
The estimated coefficient on log sales is similar to the baseline. In column 3 we
estimate efficiency by model and platform generation (such that a redesign of the
engine constitutes a new generation).11 The log sales coefficient is larger than the
baseline. Thus, there is some evidence that the baseline understates the effect of
market size on efficiency, but no evidence of a spurious estimate in the baseline
specification.
As noted in Section 2.2.1, manufacturers typically make large changes to the
power train or vehicle during major redesigns, and smaller changes between redesigns.
The baseline estimates include efficiency improvements that occur both within and
across redesigns, but the relationship between log sales and efficiency may be different
across redesigns from the relationship within redesigns. To allow for this possibility
we define a change in model generation as occurring when the model is redesigned,
and in column 4 we estimate efficiency by model and generation (we collect model
11Different models in the same year from the same brand could share a platform. One model in
consecutive model years could share one platform. Different models from different brand in a year
could share a platform if there is collaboration in the design process.
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generation information from Automotive News). The estimated coefficient on log
sales is slightly smaller than the baseline estimate, but there appears to be less
variation with which to identify the market size effect in this specification than the
baseline.
Finally, because of regular production and redesign cycles in the vehicles
market, efficiency may respond gradually to market size. Column 4 represents one
approach to allowing for this possibility, by focusing on efficiency improvements
across generations. Column 5 represents an alternative. In this case we use as the
dependent variable the three-year moving average of efficiency. The estimate is close
to the baseline, which is also the case if we use the three-year moving average of the
model’s sales (not reported).
Given the time required to redesign and test a vehicle before beginning pro-
duction of a new generation, there could be a lag between market size and adoption.
The fact that shifts in demographics and potential market size can be forecasted to
some extent mitigates the lag between demographics-driven changes in market size
and adoption, but there could nonetheless be a lag. We can consider this possibility
empirically by replacing current log sales with one or two year lags. We find 12
12Another source of measurement error for market size is that some vehicle models are produced
on global platforms and in principle technology could respond to global market size for these models.
However, even in such cases manufacturers commonly select engines and transmissions that are
specific to the market, in which case the US market size would be most relevant to the chosen
engine and transmission technologies. In addition, the United States represents about 20 percent of
global sales.
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2.4.3 Additional Channels of Technology Adoption
So far we have focused on the link between a vehicle’s market size and its
efficiency. In this subsection we consider possible indirect effects on efficiency, such
as competitors’ behavior. We report these results in Table 2.6. For comparison,
column 1 repeats the baseline specification from column 2 of Table 2.4.
First, manufacturers may respond to the efficiency of competing models (Fischer,
2010). Because consumers have heterogeneous preferences for efficiency and other
vehicle attributes, the efficiency of competing models could have a positive or negative
effect on a particular model’s efficiency. On the one hand, if a manufacturer’s
competitors increase the efficiencies of their competing vehicles, the manufacturer
might increase the efficiency of its vehicles to avoid losing customers to the other
manufacturers’ vehicles. On the other hand, instead of increasing efficiency in
response to competitors’ efficiency improvements, the manufacturer might not adopt
efficiency or even decrease efficiency and instead improve other attributes such as
cabin size. These changes would attract customers with low valuation of efficiency
and high valuation of cabin size. In column 2 of Table 2.6 we add to the baseline
specification the mean efficiency of other vehicles in the same market segment and
technology group, where we assign each manufacturer to one of three technology
groups (Japanese, US, and other). This efficiency variable may be endogenous
because of reverse causality and perhaps other reasons, and we instrument for it
using the mean potential market size of the corresponding vehicles. Column 2
provides some evidence that efficiency of competing models has a positive effect on
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technology adoption; in column 2 the coefficient on competing vehicle efficiency is
positive. The coefficient on competing efficiency suggests a more than one-for-one
effect of competing vehicle efficiency, but the large standard errors reflect the limited
variation of this variable.
Second, manufacturers could adopt efficiency-improving technologies at the
brand rather than the model level. This could occur if models share engine platforms
or because of scale economies in redesigning vehicles. Table 5 address the former
possibility but not the latter. We add to column 3 the mean frontier of other models
sold under the same brand in the same market segment, and using mean potential
market size of the corresponding models as an instrument. It is perhaps somewhat
surprising that brand-level efficiency has a small and negative effect on efficiency,
but this result could arise from the limited variation in this variable (as indicated by
the large standard error).
Third, we consider the effect of the knowledge stock on technology adoption.
To improve efficiency, manufacturers could adopt technologies that are already
widely used in the market–either in their own vehicles or in those of competing
manufacturers. Alternatively, they could innovate and adopt new technologies. We
construct a proxy for the effect of innovation and adoption of new technologies by
adding to equation (2.3) an estimate of a manufacturer’s knowledge stock based on
its historical patents. The variable is the cumulative number of fuel-saving patents
that a parent company has applied for. The variable, which is sometimes referred to
as the knowledge stock, is the sum of the depreciated patent stock from the previous
period and the flow of patents in the current period (see Zhou (2016) for details on
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variable construction). Column 4 controls for knowledge stock between 1997-2010
and shows that knowledge stock has a positive effect on efficiency, but the estimate
is not statistically significant.13
Forth, we have focused on the role of market size and fuel cost-driven willingness
to pay for technology. Consumer demand for other vehicle attributes, such as
horsepower, may also affect the adoption of fuel-saving technology. If the IV strategy
is valid, such omitted factors would not bias the estimated market size effect. To
demonstrate this point and consider the role of other factors driving technology
adoption, we add to the main regression the vehicle’s price as a proxy for consumers’
overall willingness to pay for the vehicle. Column 5 shows that adding the vehicle
price does not affect the estimate of log sales, supporting the validity of the IV
strategy. The price coefficient is positive which suggests that vehicle demand affects
technology adoption, but this coefficient is likely to be biased.
In addition, we consider lagged log sales as an alternative measure of market
size in column 6. We instrument lagged log sales using lagged instruments and we
use lagged fuel cost as potential willingness to pay for fuel cost savings. Results are
similar to our baseline. Compare to lagged sales, our baseline presents a relatively
conservative estimate of the market size effect.
In column 7, we hold vehicle purchasing pattern for each demographic cell
unchanged using vehicle purchasing information from only 2009 NHTS survey round.
Results are similar to our baseline. This result suggest that vehicle purchasing pattern
13The stock of patent variable stops at 2010. OECD Triadic Patent Family data are available
up to 2015. However, it is common knowledge not to use the last 4-5 years of TPF data due to
reporting lag from USPTO.
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by demographic groups do not vary much over our sample period, which reduces
the concern that there are omitted variable that correlate with vehicle purchasing
pattern and efficiency.
Finally, we analyze if there are heterogeneous effects of market size. In column
5, we interact market size with truck dummy. We find the point estimate of market
size effect is barely affected although it is not precisely estimated. We do not find
market size influences vehicle efficiency differently between truck and car segments.14
In column 8, we interact market size with US firm dummy. Similar to our exercise
in column 9, we do not find market size effect different across firm types.15 Both
columns suggest that there is lack of evidence of heterogeneity in market size effect
and therefore we still take column 1 as our preferred baseline results.
2.5 Implications
This section discusses four implications of the main estimates from Section
2.4. We quantify the effect of past variation in fuel prices on efficiency; the effect of
changes in demographics on efficiency; the effect of sales of crossovers and SUVs on
efficiency; and estimate the effect of a fuel tax, feebate or fuel economy standards on
the variation in efficiency across models sold in the market.
14We have also tried to interact market size with all segment dummies. Results are similar.
15We have also tried to interact market size with other firm dummies such as Japanese firm
dummy. Results are similar.
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2.5.1 Effects of Gasoline Prices on Efficiency
In Section 2.4 we quantified the economic significance of the magnitude of
the log market size coefficient by comparing the effect of a one standard deviation
market size increase with the average efficiency improvement observed in the sample.
To further illustrate the economic importance of this estimate, we compare efficiency
levels across scenarios of low and high gasoline prices.
Between 2003 and 2007 the real price of gasoline price increased almost 80
percent. Klier & Linn (2010) show that this price change increased sales of vehicles
with high fuel economy at the expense of sales of vehicles with low fuel economy.
The shifts in market shares increased sales-weighted average fuel economy by about
0.5 mpg.
We use equation (2.3) to estimate the effect of the resulting changes in market
shares on efficiency, and report the results in Figure 2.6. We assign each model in
the data to one of five fuel economy quintiles, based on each model’s initial fuel
economy when it first appears in the data. The first quintile includes vehicles with
the lowest fuel economy, and the fifth quintile includes vehicles with the highest
fuel economy. The colored bars show the average predicted efficiency increase for
each quintile using the actual fuel prices between 2003 and 2007 and the baseline
estimates of equation (2.3). The clear bars show the average predicted efficiency
increase assuming fuel prices had remained at 2003 levels.
For this exercise, we hold the market-wide average efficiency increase equal in
the two scenarios. To maintain consistency with equation (2.3), which includes year
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fixed effects that control for the market-wide average efficiency increase, we assume
that fuel prices do not affect the market-wide average rate of efficiency changes. We
do allow fuel prices to affect the cross-sectional distribution of sales, which in turn
affects the cross-sectional distribution of efficiency. We use equations (2.3) and (2.4)
to generate the counterfactual efficiency each year from 2003-2007. Because gasoline
prices are lower in the counterfactual scenario, we expect counterfactual efficiency to
be higher than predicted efficiency for the first quintile, which represents the lowest
fuel economy vehicles.
In this counterfactual exercise, we focus on the effect of fuel prices on efficiency
via market size, rather than the direct effect via consumer demand. Therefore, we
adjust fuel prices for the first stage equation (2.4) but not the second stage equation
(2.3). As a sensitivity check, Figure A.2 shows minimal differences if we also adjust
fuel prices in the second stage.
Comparing the predicted and counterfactual cumulative efficiency improve-
ments across quintiles, we observe that if fuel prices had remained at 2003 levels
efficiency would have improved 0.44 percentage points more for the lowest fuel
economy quintile, and by 0.37 percentage points less for the highest fuel economy
quintile. These effects are consistent with expectation and they are large relative to
the predicted cumulative 6.8 percentage points efficiency improvements that actually
occurred between 2003 and 2007.
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2.5.2 Effects of Demographics on Efficiency
Next we analyze how demographics affect market size and the cross-sectional
distribution of efficiency. As a counterfactual scenario, we suppose that all demo-
graphics remain unchanged at 1980 levels. The counterfactual reflects the changes
in income, age, and other demographics over the 33 years between 1980 and 2013.
In Figure 2.7, we compare predicted changes in efficiency using actual demographic
changes in the colored bars, with counterfactual efficiency changes that would have
occurred if demographics had remained fixed at 1980 levels in the clear bars.
Similarly to the fuel price exercise, we use equations (2.3) and (2.4) to predict
counterfactual efficiency improvements each year from 1997 through 2013, again
assuming that annual market-wide average efficiency improvements are unchanged
from their observed levels. Figure 2.7 compares the predicted and counterfactual
cumulative efficiency improvements from 1997 through 2013. The figure shows that
if demographics had remained constant at 1980 levels, small cars would have been
0.25 percentage points less efficient, medium cars would have been 0.67 percentage
points less efficient, SUVs would have been be 0.7 percentage points more efficient,
and pickup trucks would have been 0.54 percentage points less efficient, while other
segments are less affected. For context, the overall change between 1997 and 2013
was 24 percentage points. Thus, demographics explain some of the cross-sectional
variation in efficiency changes over the sample period.
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2.5.3 Effects of Crossover and SUV Market Size on Efficiency
Figure 2.1 shows the large shifts in sales for crossovers and SUVs that occurred
in the early 2000s. Those shifts reflect segment-level sales changes, and underlying
model-level sales changed in the same directions. Between 2000 and 2004, the average
sales per model of crossovers increased by 44 percent and average sales per model
of SUVs decreased by 25 percent. The empirical results suggest that these changes
in market size caused efficiency to increase for crossovers and to decrease for SUVs,
relative to a counterfactual in which market size had remained constant.
To quantify these effects, we analyze how cumulative efficiency would have
been affected if the market size of crossovers and SUVs remain at 2000 levels through
2004.16 In the left side of Figure 2.8 we compare the predicted and counterfactual
efficiency of crossovers (CUVs). The colored bar shows predicted cumulative efficiency
improvement over 2000-2004. The clear bar shows the simulated result holding market
size of crossovers at 2000 levels. In the counterfactual scenario, the lower market size
of crossovers causes efficiency to be 0.44 percentage points lower. This is economically
significant compared to a cumulative change of 3.6 percentage points for crossovers.
As shown in the right of Figure 2.8, the counterfactual scenario causes SUVs
to be 0.34 percentage points higher than is predicted using the actual market size
in 2004. This is substantial in magnitude compared to cumulative changes between
16Because we are only interested in the effect of market size on crossover and SUV efficiency, our
counterfactual represents a partial equilibrium outcome in which the market size of crossovers and
SUVs do not affect total vehicle sales or total cumulative efficiency across the market (that is, total
vehicle sales and average cumulative efficiency across all segments are identical in the predicted
and counterfactual scenarios).
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2000 and 2004 of 2.9 percentage points for SUVs. In short, comparing the simulations
for fuel prices, demographics, crossovers, and SUVs, we observe that market size and
fuel prices have had economically significant effects on the adoption of fuel-saving
technology.
2.5.4 Effects of Taxes, Feebates, and Fuel Economy Standards on the
Efficiency Distribution
Raising fuel taxes, introducing a carbon tax or feebate, or imposing fuel economy
standards all increase sales of vehicles with high fuel economy at the expense of
vehicles with low fuel economy. In this subsection we discuss the mechanism by
which the policies affect market size and technology adoption, and use a hypothetical
feebate to illustrate the magnitude of this effect.
A fuel tax increase or carbon price raises per-mile driving costs of all vehicles,
but more so for vehicles with low fuel economy than vehicles with high fuel economy.
The increase in relative driving costs of the low fuel economy vehicles decreases their
market size compared to those of high fuel economy vehicles.
The effect of fuel economy standards on vehicle sales arises from a different
mechanism but nonetheless has the same qualitative effect on market size. If the
standard applies to the sales-weighted mean fuel economy of a manufacturer’s vehicles,
as with the US standards and those in other regions, one compliance strategy available
to manufacturers is to reduce the prices of vehicles with high fuel economy relative to
vehicles with low fuel economy (Goldberg, 1995). The relative vehicle price change
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induces consumers to substitute from vehicles with low fuel economy to vehicles
with high fuel economy. Consequently, standards cause the sales of low fuel economy
vehicles to decrease relative to sales of high fuel economy vehicles. The shift in
market size raises the manufacturer’s sales-weighted average fuel economy.
Finally, a feebate refers to a system of taxes and rebates that jointly offers
subsidies to vehicles with high fuel economy and imposes taxes on vehicles with
low fuel economy. The taxes and rebates therefore mimic the pricing behavior of
manufacturers facing fuel economy standards, and a feebate can be designed to
achieve the outcomes that are identical to a fuel economy standard (Roth, 2014).
Thus, taxes, feebates, and fuel economy standards increase sales of vehicles
with high fuel economy relative to sales of vehicles with low fuel economy. Figure
2.6 showed that historical fuel price increases have affected the efficiency of vehicles
in the market, and we would expect a carbon price, fuel tax increase, feebate or
standard to affect efficiency.
In principle, these policies could widen or narrow the distribution of efficiencies
of vehicles in the market. If, in the absence of any policy, fuel economy is positively
correlated with efficiency, the policies would widen the distribution. This is because
the market size of vehicles with high fuel economy would increase, raising their
efficiency, and the market size of vehicles with low fuel economy would decrease,
reducing their efficiency. Both changes would strengthen the positive correlation
between fuel economy and efficiency. If, on the other hand, fuel economy is negatively
correlated with efficiency, the policies would narrow the efficiency distribution. In
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practice, the correlation is positive, 0.29, in which case we expect the policies to
increase the variance of efficiency across vehicles in the market.
In this simulation we focus on a feebate (the other policies discussed above
would have qualitatively similar effects). A feebate is determined by a pivot, which
is the fuel economy level above which vehicles receive a subsidy and below which
vehicles are taxed; and a rate of subsidy and taxation per unit of fuel economy.
We set the pivot equal to the sales-weighted mean fuel economy in year t, et. For
comparability with the fuel price counterfactual in Figure 2.6, the rate of taxation is
chosen such that the sales-weighted average fuel economy increases by 0.5 mpg, which
is the same fuel economy change as occurred in the counterfactual scenario considered
in Figure 2.6. Here we consider a per-mile feebate rather than a lump-sum feebate,
such that a model with fuel economy ejt has a feebate of (1/ejt − 1/et)× 1.53. The
counterfactual scenario includes a fee-bate for the years 2010-2013, and market conditions
(e.g., fuel prices) are otherwise unchanged. We compute the predicted and counterfactual
efficiency of each model in the sample for the years 2010 through 2013, and compute the
cumulative predicted and counterfactual efficiencies for each model. As explained above,
because of the feebate’s effect on market size, we expect the feebate to increase the variance
of efficiency across vehicles in the market.
Panel A of Figure 2.9 compares the cross-model distribution of predicted and
counterfactual efficiencies, using the cumulative efficiency changes over 2010 through
2013. The solid line shows the estimated density function of the predicted efficiency,
and the dashed line shows the estimated density function of the counterfactual
efficiency had the feebate in place. Consistent with expectations, the figure shows
that the feebate increases the variance of efficiency across vehicles in the market.
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Further illustrating the effects of the feebate on the distribution of efficiency
in the market, Panel B of Figure 2.9 presents a scatter plot of efficiency and fuel
economy for each model in the sample. The solid dots represent the predicted
cumulative efficiencies of models sold in 2013 and the black circles are counterfactual
cumulative efficiencies. Because the feebate reduces the market size of vehicles with
fuel economy below the pivot, the counterfactual efficiency lies below the predicted
efficiency for models with fuel economy below the pivot. In contrast, the feebate
increases the market size of vehicles with fuel economy above the pivot, and causes
counterfactual efficiency to lie above predicted efficiency for such vehicles. The lines
in Panel B represent the fitted values of a linear regression of efficiency on fuel
economy. The counterfactual line is steeper than the predicted line, which indicates
that the feebate strengthens the positive relationship between efficiency and fuel
economy.
Previous welfare analysis of these policies has not considered their effects on
market size and technology adoption, which have several implications both for the
cost effectiveness of the policies as well as their distributional effects. First, the
feebate introduces a shadow cost of fuel economy, inducing manufacturers to increase
the fuel economy of all vehicles. Our analysis illustrates an unintended consequence
of the feebate, which is that because of the feebate’s effect on market size, the feebate
causes manufacturers to decrease the efficiency of their vehicles with fuel economy
below the pivot. The market size effect lies behind this unintended effect, which
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could undermine the effectiveness of feebates or taxes at reducing fuel consumption.17
Second, and following from the first, by affecting the distribution of efficiency across
vehicles in the market, these policies will cause consumers to purchase different
vehicles than they would have if market size did not affect efficiency. Because each
vehicle’s fuel economy required by the standards depends on its footprint (roughly,
the area defined by the four wheels), changes in consumer purchase decisions will
affect market-wide average fuel economy and therefore the effectiveness of the policies
at reducing fuel consumption and greenhouse gas emissions. While estimating the
welfare consequences of these efficiency improvements lies outside the scope of
this paper, the scenario considered here illustrates the effects of these policies on
the distribution of efficiency across vehicles in the market. Third, alternative fuel
technologies likely are closest substitutes to gasoline-powered vehicles with high fuel
economy. If a policy raises the efficiency of high fuel economy gasoline-powered
vehicles, it would reduce consumer demand for alternative fuel vehicles.
2.6 Conclusion
Current US fuel economy standards will dramatically increase the average fuel
economy of new vehicles over at least the next decade. Despite the magnitude of
this fuel economy change and the importance of technology adoption for meeting
the standards, there is little empirical evidence on which factors determine a man-
17Although our analysis suggests that the market size effect undermines the effectiveness of fuel
consumption policies, the market size effect does not necessarily undermine the economic efficiency
of these policies. It may be economic efficient to have the most efficient cars improved the most
and least efficient cars improved the least.
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ufacturer’s adoption of fuel-saving technologies. This paper analyzes the effect of
market size, as approximated by vehicle sales, on the adoption of efficiency-improving
technologies in the US passenger vehicle market. We show that market size has a
substantial effect on technology adoption and discuss implications for the evolution
of technology adoption and fuel policies.
We motivate the empirical analysis using a simple model of energy efficiency
technology adoption, which shows that fixed costs of technology adoption cause
adoption to depend on a vehicle’s market size. The empirical analysis uses a unique
data set that combines vehicle characteristics and sales with vehicle purchasing
patterns by demographic group from 1997-2013. We address the endogeneity of
market size by instrumenting for vehicle sales using potential market size. Variation
in potential market size arises from changes in demographics over time and cross-
sectional heterogeneity in purchasing patterns across demographic groups. In the
preferred specification we find that a 10 percent increase in sales (corresponding to
about one standard deviation) increases efficiency by 0.3 percentage points, compared
to a mean annual efficiency improvement of about 1.4 percentage points in the sample.
Fuel costs affect efficiency via market size but not independently of market size.
Acemoglu et al. (2016) find that high fuel prices increase clean technology innovation,
and given our findings that fuel prices affect technology adoption primarily via
innovation, future research can address whether innovation responds directly to fuel
prices or to fuel price-driven changes in market size.
The results have four main implications. The first is that historical variation
in fuel prices has had a substantial effect on new vehicle technologies. Real fuel
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prices nearly doubled between 2003 and 2007. If gasoline prices had remained at
2003 levels, the efficiency of vehicles with low fuel economy would have increased 0.5
percentage points more between 2003 and 2007 than it did. Efficiency of the highest
fuel economy vehicles would have increased by 0.2 percentage points less than it did.
Second, demographics have had a large effect on vehicle efficiency. Shifts in
demographics increased efficiency of cars relative to light trucks. Third, shifts in
market size of crossovers and SUVs have caused large changes in the efficiency of
these vehicles. These three results imply that market size and fuel costs have had
economically significant effects on technology adoption in the new vehicles market.
The final implication is that a fuel tax, feebate, or fuel economy standard
increases the cross-sectional variation in efficiency by raising the efficiency of vehicles
with high fuel economy relative to vehicles with low fuel economy. Because the
existing literature on the welfare effects of these policies has not considered this
effect, we suggest that future research should consider it. Accounting for the effects
of market size and fuel costs on technology adoption would affect the estimated cost
effectiveness and the distributional consequences of these policies, as well as the
demand for alternative fuel vehicles such as plug-in electrics.
The empirical analysis does not identify the underlying reasons why market
size affects efficiency. The simple model we introduced to motivate the empirical
analysis emphasizes the role of fixed costs in vehicle production, but other factors
could contribute to the positive relationship between market size and technology
adoption, such as scale economies in vehicle production. Future work may address
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B: Light Trucks
Notes: For each market segment, the figure plots the total model year sales. Panel A
includes passenger cars and Panel B includes light-duty trucks.
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Figure 2.2: Vehicle Purchase Patterns by Demographic Group
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Notes: The figure is constructed using the NHTS survey data from the 1995, 2001, and 2009
survey waves. Each panel illustrates purchasing patterns for the indicated demographic
variable. For households purchasing vehicles in a particular market segment, we compute
the share of those households belonging to each category of the demographic variable, using
the NHTS household survey weights. For example, among the households that purchase
small cars, 64% of them live in urban areas.
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Notes: Using household survey weights from the CPS, we compute the weighted average of
each demographic variable by year. The figure plots the percentage change since 1997 of
each variable.
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Notes: The figure is constructed from the EPA Fuel Economy Guide and EPA Fuel Economy
Trends data. Technology penetration rates are the unweighted average across all vehicles in
the corresponding model year.
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Notes: The figure plots the mean estimated efficiency across passenger cars and light trucks
estimated from equation (2.2). To construct this figure, efficiency is normalized to zero for
all observations in 1997.
133
























Lowest MPG Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Highest MPG
Hold gas prices at 2003 levels
Predicted cumulative efficiency increase over 2003−2007
Counterfactual cumulative efficiency increase over 2003−2007
Notes: For each observation in equation (2.3), the frontier is predicted using the estimates
reported in column 2 of Table 2.4. All observations are assigned to a fuel economy quintile
based on the fuel economy distribution across observations between 2003 and 2007, using
each vehicle model’s initial fuel economy when the model enters the market. The predicted
frontier in each colored bar is the mean cumulative predicted efficiency change between 2003
and 2007 for each quintile. The clear bars show the cumulative counterfactual efficiency
change by quintile. Counterfactual efficiency changes are computed by holding fixed fuel
prices at 2003 levels and using equations (2.3) and (2.4) to predict the efficiency change for
each observation between 2003 and 2007.
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Sm Car Med Car Lg/Lux Car CUV SUV Van Pickup
Hold demographics at 1980 levels
Predicted cumulative efficiency increase over 1980−2013
Counterfactual cumulative efficiency increase over 1980−2013
Notes: The colored bars show the mean cumulative predicted efficiency increase between
1980 and 2013, for each market segment. Predicted values are obtained from the estimation
of equation (2.3) reported in column 2 of Table 2.4. The clear bars show the cumulative
counterfactual efficiency change by market segment. The counterfactual holds fixed demo-
graphics at 1980 levels and uses equations (2.3) and (2.4) to predict the counterfactual
efficiency change for each observation between 1980 and 2013.
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Hold SUV sales at 2000 levels
Predicted cumulative efficiency increase between 2000 and 2004
Counterfactual cumulative efficiency increase between 2000 and 2004
Notes: The colored bars show the mean cumulative predicted efficiency increase between
2000 and 2004 for crossovers (left panel) and SUVs (right panel). Predicted values are
obtained from the estimation of equation (2.3) reported in column 2 of Table 2.4. The clear
bars show the cumulative counterfactual efficiency changes for crossovers and SUVs. The
counterfactual holds fixed crossover sales at 2000 levels and uses equation (2.3) to predict
the counterfactual efficiency change for each crossover and SUV between 2000 and 2004.
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Figure 2.9: Effect of Feebate on Efficiency
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Predicted efficiency increases 2010−2013 Predicted
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Notes: For each observation in equation (2.3), the frontier is predicted using the estimates reported
in column 2 of Table 2.4. The counterfactual efficiency of each vehicle is computed from the market
size caused by introducing a feebate of (1/ejt−1/et)×1.53, where ejt is the fuel economy of model j
in year t and et is the harmonic mean of fuel economy in year t. Panel A shows the estimated density
functions of cumulative predicted and counterfactual efficiencies over the period 2010 through 2013.
Panel B is a scatter plot of efficiency and fuel economy for each model in the sample. The solid
dots represent cumulative predicted efficiency and the circles represent cumulative counterfactual
efficiency. The two lines are the linear prediction of efficiency on fuel economy.
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Table 2.1: Average Vehicle Characteristics over 1997-2013
Model Year Fuel economy Horsepower Torque Weight Number of
(miles per gallon) (newton-meters) (pounds) cylinders
1997 25.4 184 301 3607 6.0
2000 24.9 201 317 3746 6.2
2005 24.9 232 344 4028 6.3
2010 26.3 262 368 4230 6.2
2013 29.1 275 377 4226 6.0
Notes: The table reports the sales-weighted average of fuel economy (in miles per gallon),
horsepower, torque (maximum torque in newton-meters), weight (in pounds), and number
of cylinders for the indicated years.
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Table 2.2: Estimated Tradeoffs Between Fuel Economy and Other Characteristics
Dependent variable: Passenger Cars Light-Duty Trucks
Log fuel economy
Log horsepower -0.224*** -
(0.014) -
Log torque - -0.157***
- (0.016)




Manual transmission 0.008 -0.004
(0.004) (0.004)




* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01.
Notes: The table reports coefficient estimates from equation (2.2), with standard errors
in parentheses, clustered by model and model year. Observations are by model year and
model version. The sample in column 1 includes passenger cars and the sample in column 2
includes light-duty trucks. In addition to the reported coefficients, the regressions include
model by model year interactions, fixed effects for the number of cylinders, and fixed effects
for the number of doors, similarly to Klier & Linn (2016).
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Table 2.3: Estimated Efficiency for High and Low-Selling Vehicles
High-Selling Vehicles Low-Selling Vehicles
Efficiency in Cumulative Efficiency in Cumulative
Time Period starting ending change starting ending change
year year year year
1997-2000 0 0.017 0.017 0 0.0126 0.012
2001-2005 0.019 0.069 0.050 0.006 0.057 0.050
2006-2009 0.067 0.140 0.072 0.078 0.134 0.056
2010-2013 0.156 0.239 0.083 0.160 0.232 0.072
Notes: Efficiency is estimated by model, market segment, and model year in equation (2.2),
using the specification reported in Table 2.2. Models are assigned one of two categories
depending on whether their sales are above the median sales in the initial year of the
indicated time period. The table reports the mean estimated efficiency across the two
groups and time periods in the first and last years of each period, as well as the cumulative
change in mean efficiency over the time period.
140
Table 2.4: Estimation Results: Effect of Market Size and Fuel Costs on Efficiency
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A. Dependent variable: Efficiency
Log sales 0.006*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.029*** 0.025*** 0.034*** 0.032*** 0.030***
(0.001) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008)
Fuel costs -0.410*** -0.168 -0.178* -0.153 0.201 -0.178 -0.306***
(0.052) (0.110) (0.099) (0.144) (0.162) (0.127) (0.115)
CAFE Stringency 0.048 -0.126
(0.033) (0.087)
Fuel costs×CAFE Stringency 1.306**
(0.648)
Panel B. First Stage Estimate. Dependent variable: Log sales
Potential market size (log) 0.139*** 0.112*** 0.117*** 0.179*** 0.161*** 0.115*** 0.159***
(0.037) (0.039) (0.040) (0.036) (0.037) (0.039) (0.042)
Fuel costs -12.017*** -8.800*** -16.544*** -14.133*** -10.759*** -10.527***
(1.155) (1.164) (1.570) (1.812) (1.277) (1.717)
If market size is imputed -0.391*** -0.385*** -0.506*** -0.521*** -0.389*** -0.398*** -0.432***
(0.053) (0.056) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.058)
Estimated by: OLS IV, Baseline IV IV IV IV IV IV
Brand FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes





Obs. 2,722 2,722 2727 2,722 2727 2,722 2,722 2,722
RMSE 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07
F (1st stg. NA 32.69 31.76 31.96 43.42 29.73 27.40 25.96
excl. var.)
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01.
Notes: The table reports coefficient estimates from equation (2.3), with bootstrapped standard errors
in parentheses, clustered by brand (make). Observations are by model and model year. Column
1 is estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS) and columns 2-5 are estimated by instrumental
variables, using potential market size and the imputation dummy as instruments according to
equation (2.4). The bottom of the table reports the F statistics of a joint test of the significance of
the excluded variables. All regressions include brand fixed effects, year fixed effects, and brand
fixed effects interacted with a linear time trend. Column 4 includes brand fixed effects interacted
with a quadratic time trend. Column 6 includes the triple interaction of brand fixed effects by
light-duty truck class by linear time trend. Column 7 includes a set of segment fixed effects with a
linear time trend. Column 4 include additional CAFE stringency control as described in (Klier &
Linn, 2016).
Table 2.5: Alternative Methods for Estimating Efficiency
















Log sales 0.030*** 0.041*** 0.039** 0.035*** 0.040***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.018) (0.013) (0.010)
Fuel costs -0.168 -0.033 -0.554*** -0.560*** 0.083
(0.110) (0.144) (0.171) (0.200) (0.141)
Brand FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Brand FE×t Yes Yes Yes Yes
Company FE Yes
Company×t Yes
Observations 2722 1953 526 541 2084
RMSE 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.06
F (1st stg. 32.69 16.23 7.74 11.64 20.32
excl. var.)
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Notes: The table reports coefficient estimates with bootstrapped standard errors in paren-
theses, clustered by brand (make). In column 2 efficiency is estimated by platform and
model year. In column 3 efficiency is estimated by model and platform generation. In
column 4 efficiency is estimated by model generation and model year. In column 5 efficiency
is estimated by model and model year, as in the baseline, but the dependent variable
is the three-year moving average of efficiency. In all columns, the independent variables
are aggregated to match the aggregation of the dependent variable. All regressions are
estimated by instrumental variables using potential market size as an instrument, as in
Table 2.4.
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Table 2.6: Additional Factors Affecting Efficiency
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Baseline Lagged NHTS 09 Truck US firm
log sales round
Log sales 0.030*** 0.034 0.023* 0.028* 0.031*** 0.040*** 0.025*** 0.026 0.035*
(0.007) (0.023) (0.011) (0.011) (0.007) (0.009) (0.010) (0.022) (0.012)
Fuel costs -0.168 1.156 -0.239 -0.237 -1.026*** 0.036 0.062 0.408 -0.157











Log sales×US firm -0.051
(0.075)
Brand FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Brand FE×t Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2722 2722 2722 2318 2722 2384 2727 2727 2727
RMSE 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06
F (1st stg. 32.69 25.17 22.92 20.91 35.32 27.39 25.33 22.07 21.90
excl. var.)
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01.
Notes: The table reports coefficient estimates with bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses,
clustered by brand (make). Column 1 repeats the baseline regression from column 2 of Table
2.4. We assign each manufacturer to one of three technology groups: Japanese, US, and other.
Column 2 includes the average efficiency by technology group as an independent variable. This
variable is instrumented using the corresponding average potential market size of those models.
Column 3 includes the average efficiency of other models sold under the same brand in the same
market segment, using the average potential market size as an instrument. Column 4 includes the
manufacturer’s knowledge stock, which is the cumulative number of fuel-saving patents that a parent
company has applied for. Column 5 includes the log of the vehicle’s price as an independent variable.
Columns 1-3 and 5-7 include observations from 1997-2013 and column 4 includes observations
from 1997-2010. Columns 2 and 3 use the potential market size of the corresponding vehicles to
instrument for competing models and models sold under the same brand. Column 6 presents results
if we use lagged market size, as well as lagged fuel cost, potential market size, and impute dummy.
In Column 7, we hold vehicle purchasing pattern for each demographic cell unchanged using vehicle
purchasing information from 2009 NHTS survey round only. In Column 8, we interact market size
with truck dummy. In Column 9, we interact market size with US firm dummy.
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Notes: Using household survey weights from the CPS, we compute the weighted average of
each demographic variable by year. The figure plots the percentage change since 1980 of
each variable.
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Lowest MPG Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Highest MPG
Hold gas prices at 2003 levels
redicted cumulative efficiency increase over 2003−2007
Counterfactual cumulative efficiency increase over 2003−2007
Notes: Notes: For each observation in equation (2.3), the frontier is predicted using the
estimates reported in column 3 of Table 2.4. All observations are assigned to a fuel economy
quintile based on the fuel economy distribution across observations between 2003 and
2007, using each vehicle model’s initial fuel economy when the model enters the market.
The predicted frontier in colored bar is the mean cumulative predicted efficiency change
between 2003 and 2007 for each quintile. The clear bars show the cumulative counterfactual
efficiency change by quintile. Counterfactual efficiency changes are computed by holding
fixed fuel prices at 2003 levels and using equations (2.3) and (2.4) to predict the efficiency
change for each observation between 2003 and 2007.
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1 0-34 0-25 0-12 1 urban New England
2 35-54 25-50 12 + 2 not urbanized Middle Atlantic
3 55+ 50-75 3 East North Central
4 75-100 4 West North Central
5 100+ 5 + South Atlantic
6 East South Central





3 9 2 5 2 9
Total Number of Groups: 2,700
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